How much tax do companies pay in the UK? by Habu, Katarzyna
How much tax do companies pay in 
the UK? 
 
 
      WP 17/14 
The paper is circulated for discussion purposes only, contents should be considered preliminary and are not to 
be quoted or reproduced without the author’s permission. 
July 2017 
Katarzyna Habu 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation  
 
Working paper series | 2017 
How much tax do companies pay in the UK?
Evidence from UK condential corporate tax returns.
Katarzyna Anna Habu
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation and Oxford University
This version: May 2017
Abstract
This paper uses the full population of UK corporate tax returns from Her
Majestys Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to explore the question of how much
tax companies pay in the UK. In particular, I compare taxable prots of companies
in the UK di¤erentiating by their ownership type. I show that multinational com-
panies pay the majority, 55%, of UK corporation tax, in spite of constituting only
3% of the population of companies in the UK. However, the fraction of tax rev-
enues collected from multinationals has declined over time. Further, multinational
companies pay very little tax relative to their size in comparison to domestic com-
panies. I nd that di¤erences between size and sectoral distributions and leverage
partially explain the large gap in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets between
multinationals and domestic rms. In contrast, di¤erences in investment rates and
productivity between these types of companies do not.
JEL: H25, H32, Key words: tax payments, UK tax revenues, multinational
companies
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1 Introduction
If you search online for a phrase "How much tax do companies pay in the UK?" you will
discover that there are 1 million recent articles on this subject. The titles, such as "How
much tax does Facebook pay in the UK?" by The Guardian or "Six British multinationals
did not pay any UK corporation tax in 2014" by the Independent, have been commonly
seen in the UK press over the recent years. Why is there so much interest in the question
of how much tax companies pay? One answer lies in the fact that no one really knows.
Companiesnancial statements show that a substantial fraction of very large rms in
the United Kingdom report losses and hence pay no corporation tax. However, without
tax returns data we do not know the actual tax payments of companies resident in the
UK to the UK revenue authorities.
This paper uses Her Majestys Revenue and Customs (HMRC) condential corpo-
rate tax returns data for the United Kingdom to answer the question of how much tax
companies pay in the UK. In particular, I focus on a comparison between multinational
and domestic companiestaxable prots, using a unique match of tax returns data with
nancial statements and ownership data.
The economic literature provides us with some answers to the question of how much
tax companies pay. For instance, we know that foreign headquartered multinational
companies tend to report much lower taxable prots than domestic companies in the
United States.1 A contribution of the current paper is to examine whether the tax
reporting behaviour of companies in the UK mirrors that of the US domiciled companies.
This issue has not been previously studied, as it requires tax returns data. The US has
been one of the rst countries which made tax returns data available for research purposes.
The UK has followed in their footsteps only recently by making their corporate tax returns
information available to academics.
To advance our understanding of what drives the di¤erences in taxable prots between
companies with various ownership structure, I study the di¤erences in tax payments
between companies from various industries and of di¤erent sizes. I also explore whether
the di¤erences in taxable prots between ownership types are related to di¤erences in
leverage, capital allowances claimed, other tax deductions and productivity. I further our
understanding of how much tax companies pay by using more disaggregated ownership
categories, such as foreign multinational and domestic multinationals or domestic groups
and domestic standalones.
I nd that multinational companies, in spite of constituting only 3% of companies
operating in the UK, have contributed 55% of total annual corporate tax revenue to
the UK government from 2000 to 2011. The proportion of tax paid by multinational
companies has decreased from 60% at the beginning of the sample, in 2000, to 50% at the
1Grubert et al. (1993), McCauley (1994), Mataloni (2000), Grubert (1998), Mills and Newberry (2004)
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end of it, in 2011. Further, multinational companies have contributed about 40% of UK
trading turnover and have constituted about 70% of total assets of UK companies in the
analyzed time period. The proportion of total assets held by multinational companies has
increased from 60% at the beginning of the sample to over 75% in 2011, while the fraction
of trading turnover attributable to multinational companies has uctuated considerably
over the years, with the highest - 60% - in 2008 and the lowest - 25% - in 2009.
This paper focuses on the di¤erences in taxable prots between multinational and do-
mestic companies. Since UK subsidiaries of both multinational companies headquartered
in foreign countries (foreign multinationals) and multinationals headquartered in the UK
(domestic multinationals) are generally larger in scale and more protable than domes-
tic companies, one would expect multinationals to pay the majority of UK corporation
tax. However, the question remains as to whether multinationals shouldbe paying even
more. I investigate this by comparing multinationals to domestic companies and nd
that, on average, multinationals report lower taxable prots relative to their size than
domestic companies. This is especially true for the di¤erences between multinationals
and domestic standalones, where domestic standalonesratio of taxable prots to total
assets is between 0.1 and 0.12, while for foreign multinationals this ratio is 0.012. Domes-
tic groups do tend to report a much lower taxable prots to total assets ratio (0.015-0.02)
than domestic standalones, but higher than multinationals.
I further nd that over 60% of all multinational rm-year observations report zero
taxable prots and hence pay no corporation tax between 2000 and 2011; similar holds
for 50% of domestic groups and 28% of domestic standalones rm-year observations. I
nd that companies reporting zero taxable prots do not di¤er from companies reporting
positive taxable prots in terms of their observable rm-level characteristics. Companies
which report zero taxable prots are very similar in terms of size, age and industry
composition to those reporting positive taxable prots. Further, foreign multinational
companies that report zero taxable prots in the UK are not consistently headquartered in
countries with lower corporate tax rates that the UK. Companies headquartered in lower
tax countries than the UKmay have a higher incentive to report zero taxable prots in the
UK and positive prots in their lower rate headquarters. The only signicantly important
determinant of reporting zero taxable prots this year is the rms propensity to report
zero taxable prots in previous years. I nd considerable persistence in the duration of
the zero taxable prot reporting spell. Within the subsample of companies which are
observed continuously for the whole sample period of 12 years, foreign multinationals
report zero taxable prots for 6 years on average, while domestic standalones report zero
taxable prots for 3 years on average.
Multinational companies are much larger than domestic companies. When I compare
companies of similar sizes, I nd that their tax payments are more similar to each other.
In contrast, the very large multinational companies report very low ratios of taxable
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prots to total assets. Foreign multinationals, domestic groups and other (unidentied)
groups have substantially higher leverage than other types of companies. Firms in the
mining sector have the highest taxable prots to total assets ratios, while rms in the
nance, insurance and real estate sectors have the lowest. The latter is especially true
for multinationals. These di¤erences in observable characteristics between companies
partially explain why multinational companies report much lower taxable prots relative
to their size than domestic companies.
There may be reasons other than tax avoidance why we observe multinational com-
panies reporting taxable prots than domestic companies. First, it could be that multi-
national companies perform consistently worse than domestic companies. However, this
is unlikely given widely accepted evidence that multinationals are more productive than
domestic companies (Yeaple (2013), Harris and Robinson (2003), Gri¢ th (1999), Ben-
fratello and Sembenelli (2006), Girma and Gorg (2007), Wang and Wang (2015)). In
any case, calculating a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) for multinational and
domestic companies in my data reveals that the former are far more productive, which
is consistent with the previous empirical evidence. Another reason could be that multi-
national companies might report zero taxable prots more frequently because they have
more frequent losses than domestic companies. The UK system treats losses asymmet-
rically and when the company makes losses it reports zero taxable prots on the tax
form. The rm can recover a portion of those losses once it becomes protable again, by
carrying them forwards and o¤setting them against its future taxable prots. To do so,
it has to record those losses on the tax form, which allows me to reconcile the companies
which report zero taxable prots with those making losses. However, even after excluding
companies which reported losses in the current period and hence are not liable to pay any
corporation tax this period, 34 percent of foreign multinational companies report zero
taxable prots relative to only 10 percent of domestic standalones. Finally, given that
only an average of 9 percent of all companies brought forward losses from previous years
to o¤set against their taxable prots in the current year, negative trading prots and
low productivity do not appear to be the main reason driving the di¤erences in taxable
prots between multinational and domestic companies.2
A second possible explanation is the fact that multinational companies and domestic
groups can benet from group tax relief, which is not available to domestic standalones.3
However, the tax returns data shows that only 2 percent of companies reporting zero
taxable prots use group tax relief to reduce their taxable prots to zero, suggesting
2De Simone et al. (2015) and Hopland et al. (2015) both consider prot shifting with loss making
companies and how presence of those a¢ liaties in the group a¤ects the standard prot shifting incentives.
3A company with multiple subsidiaries in the UK, whether domestic or multinational, can use group
relief o¤ered by HMRC to o¤set losses made by one of the companies in a group against prots of
another company in that group in the same year (https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/company-
taxation-manual/ctm80145).
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that group tax relief is unlikely to be the main driver of companies minimizing their
taxable prots to zero.4 Further, group tax relief cannot explain the observation from
the data that the di¤erence in taxable prots between multinational companies with one
establishment in the UK (i.e. companies which would not be eligible for group tax relief)
and domestic standalones is also very large.
A third reason could be that multinational companies undertake more investment or
research and development (R&D), which are tax deductible, than domestic companies.
However, the tax returns data reveals that it is domestic companies which claim more
capital allowances relative to their size, contradicting this hypothesis.
This paper establishes that the di¤erences in the observable rm level characteristics
are unable to explain fully the size of the gap in the ratio of taxable prots to total
assets between multinational and domestic companies. This suggests that companies
may instead di¤er in terms of their unobservable characteristics, such as for example
ability to use tax planning strategies to minimize their UK tax liability. In what follows,
section 2 describes the data, section 3 outlines the stylized facts and section 4 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Data description and sample selection criteria
The primary data source used in this paper is the condential universe of unconsolidated
corporation tax returns in the UK for the years 2000 - 2011 provided by HMRC. The
dataset comprises all items that are submitted on the corporation tax return form (CT600
form) and the unit of observation is an unconsolidated statement in each of the years (see
Appendix for the form). The information available encompasses various sources of taxable
income, deductions and a nal gure of taxable prots together with tax liability and
tax payment. Each company is required to ll in at least taxable prots (box 37) and
corporation tax liability (box 63) information (for details of box numbers and related
variable names see Table 9 in the Appendix). However, rms are not required to ll
in every single box on the CT600 form and, in fact, they do not. What is more, the
HMRC data does not o¤er any rm level characteristic variables, apart from trading
turnover. Therefore I merge the HMRC data with the accounting data from FAME
dataset. FAME dataset, collected by Bureau van Dijk, includes balance sheet information
for UK companies. For instance, it provides information on total assets, accounting
prots, age of rms, number of employees, industry or leverage.
4The fraction of companies using group loss o¤set provisions to reduce their taxable prots to zero
does not vary between ownership types.
5
2.1.1 Ownership denition
FAME dataset also includes information on rm ownership, which I use to identify rms
into various ownership categories. FAME ownership dataset is a cross section from the
latest edition of the dataset (2013). I identify multinational companies based on whether
they have any a¢ liates abroad (parents or subsidiaries). I distinguish between multina-
tionals headquartered in the UK (domestic multinationals) and multinationals headquar-
tered abroad (foreign multinationals). I dene all other rms as domestic companies,
but I distinguish between domestic groups and domestic standalones. I dene a domestic
standalone as an independent company, which has no a¢ liates. I dene a domestic group
as a company that is part of a group that has no foreign a¢ liates.5
I supplement the FAME ownership data with other variables from FAME and HMRC
datasets to identify companies into two additional ownership categories, which I call
unidentied multinationaland other groups. Unidentied multinationals are compa-
nies that have overseas income or have claimed double tax relief in the UK, while other
groups are companies which have claimed group relief or have reported they have losses
to surrender as group relief.6
Table 1 shows the number of rms and observations by ownership types using the
7 main categories described above: foreign multinational, domestic multinational, do-
mestic group, domestic standalone, other group, unidentied multinational and missing
ownership. Since FAME is most likely to report no ownership information in cases where
companies are independent standalones, the companies in the missing ownership category
are plausibly domestic standalones. The unidentied multinationals are most likely a mix
of foreign and domestic multinationals. Over the analyzed time period, 2000 - 2011, 3.1%
of companies are identied as multinationals, 36% are identied as domestic.7 ;8
2.1.2 Sample selected for the analysis
Matching HMRC data with the accounting data restricts the sample size. I nd a matched
unconsolidated accounting statement in FAME for 76 percent of unconsolidated tax re-
turns from HMRC data, which includes 89 percent of the total tax liability and 92 percent
of total trading turnover in the UK. I further ensure that I have non-missing total as-
sets information and full 12 months accounting period for each matched HMRC-FAME
5This is only to the extent that I see no foreign a¢ liates 10 levels down for this company OR that its
parent company has no foreign a¢ liates 10 levels down either.
6For more details on the criteria I used to identify companies into various ownership groups see
Appendix 5.1.
7The remaining 61% of companies which I classied as missing ownership are most likely domestic
standalones, which would imply that 97% of companies in the UK are domestic.
8The number of companies in each category has been increasing over time; the largest increase is for
domestic standalones; their number increased ve times between 2000 and 2011.
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Table 1: Number of observations by ownership category.
 no of obs no of firms % of total firms 
foreign multinational  382,353   45,839  1.4% 
domestic multinational  43,249   4,751  0.1% 
domestic group  911,670   112,026  3.5% 
domestic standalone  3,573,689   608,231  18.9% 
other group  3,105,551   435,654  13.6% 
unidentified multinational  427,459   50,268  1.6% 
missing ownership  8,304,161   1,953,622  60.9% 	Note: Number of company-year observations classied into each owner-
ship category. Whole sample. Source: HMRC data.
observation and call the obtained sample the selected sample.9
The selected sample is representative of the whole population. The chosen selection
criteria exclude a similar proportion of number of observations, tax liabilities, taxable
prots and trading turnover across the ownership types. Therefore the distribution of
taxable prots and tax liabilities across ownership types is similar in the full population
of UK companies and in the selected sample, which allows me to draw externally valid
inference.
The majority of the comparisons in the paper focuses on the three distinct ownership
types: foreign multinationals, domestic standalones and domestic groups; other groups
are very similar to domestic groups, unidentied multinationals to foreign multinationals,
while observations in the missing ownership category are similar to domestic standalones.
I discuss domestic multinationals separately. This is because more than half of all domes-
tic multinational companies in my sample report only consolidated accounts in FAME
data. Therefore, the sample of matched FAME-HMRC domestic multinationals is quite
small.
2.2 The choice of variables for the analysis
In this section I discuss the choice of the main variables for comparison of the prot
reporting behaviour between companies. The decision to use the ratio of taxable prots
to total assets is driven both by the conceptual issues and by the data availability. I
further describe the merits of alterative options for both numerator and denominator of
the ratio.
Most of the work in the public economics and nance literature, which focuses on
corporation taxes, uses a measure of an e¤ective tax rate to compare the tax paying
behaviour of companies. The e¤ective tax rate is dened as a measure of accounting
tax liability divided by a measure of accounting prots before tax. This rate would
9Section 1.5.1 in the Appendix describes each selection criteria in detail and discusses what each of
them implies for the analyzed sample.
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be equivalent to the statutory tax rate, if accounting prots were equivalent to taxable
prots and accounting measure of tax was equal to the actual tax liability. However, due
to numerous deductions, capital allowances, group loss o¤set provisions and tax avoidance
it is usually lower.
Using e¤ective tax rates to compare companiestax-paying behaviour has two main
di¢ culties. The rst one is that accounting prots appear to be systematically di¤erent
than taxable prots for multinational companies but not for domestic companies. One
reason for this may be that accounting prots measures might be a¤ected by prot shifting
to a larger degree for multinational companies.10 This might generate a bias that could
a¤ect the comparison of e¤ective tax rates based on accounting prot measures between
ownership types. The second reason is that accounting prots are missing for a large
proportion of observations in my sample.
Scaling tax liability from the tax returns by taxable prots by construction would yield
the statutory tax rate. In turn, scaling tax liability by a measure of accounting prots
and comparing it to statutory tax rates would in e¤ect measure the di¤erence between
taxable and accounting prots. Since the main objective of this paper is to establish
whether there are systematic di¤erences in the taxable prots reported by multinational
and domestic companies, the discussion of the di¤erences between accounting and taxable
prots is of secondary importance.
An alternative approach to compare the tax-paying behaviour of companies is to use a
measure of tax liability from the returns but consider other scaling factors that are related
to the size of the company, but might not be a¤ected by companiesprot shifting to the
same extent as accounting prots might be. The alternatives here are trading turnover
from HMRC data, total or xed assets from FAME data or shareholder funds from FAME
data. I discuss each of these options in turn.
HMRC data includes information on trading turnover of companies, which is the
total value of the sales of a company which arise from its trading activities. Since trad-
ing turnover only covers information on trading activities of companies, for consistency
purposes the taxable prot measure used when scaling by trading turnover should also
only include prots from trading activities, i.e. trading prots. However, a substan-
tial fraction of taxable prots of multinational companies (over 30 percent) comes from
activities other than trading, such as overseas income, interest on loans, capital gains
(Figure 7, Appendix). This is not the case for domestic standalones which derive almost
all of their taxable prots from trading activities. Therefore using this measure would
disproportionately bias downwards the taxable prots of multinational companies.
What is more, since the trading turnover information comes from the HMRC data,
we would expect it to have a universal coverage. However, companies are not required
10Accounting prots include retained prots, royalty and interest receipts all of which could be ma-
nipulated.
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to report trading turnover to the HMRC and as a result many do not. In fact, the
fraction of missing observations is larger for trading turnover than for total assets in case
of multinationals, but not in case of domestic standalones. This could imply that using
trading turnover as a size measure may bias the sample composition towards domestic
standalones. However, it turns out that when considering the samples with non-missing
trading turnover and non-missing total assets, they appear to be broadly comparable in
terms of their main observable characteristics, in particular, the ratios of taxable prots
to total assets. Hence, I do not consider the choice of the size measure to be driving the
results shown in this paper.
What is more, trading turnover is quite volatile and responds more strongly to busi-
ness cycle uctuations than taxable prots. This is because the measure of taxable prots
includes prots not only from trading activities, which vary a lot over time, but also other
sources of prots such an interest from bank deposits, overseas income, net gains etc.11
Therefore using trading turnover as a scaling measure could introduce additional uctu-
ations unrelated to the systematic di¤erences in taxable prots between the ownership
types.12
The size measures available in the accounts, especially the items from the balance
sheet such as total assets, xed assets and shareholder funds o¤er an alternative scaling
factor.13 Total assets are less volatile than trading turnover, hence they should be a
better approximation of rms overall size over time. There are several concerns that may
be raised against using total assets as a scaling measure for rms prots. First, total
assets include investments, part of which is the equity value of all subsidiaries that a
company owns, which might make a company appear larger than its UK operations are.
To alleviate this concern, rst, I remove investments from total assets, in cases where data
allows it. Second, for foreign multinationals and domestic groups I only use observations
which report to have zero subsidiaries themselves. I am unable to do so for domestic
multinationals, as 99 percent of them report to have at least one subsidiary. This is likely
to be important in understanding why domestic multinationals appear to have one of the
lowest ratios of taxable prots to total assets of all the ownership types.
A second issue is that total assets measure is equivalent to the sum of shareholder
funds and liabilities. The interest payments (on debt) are deductible so that the corpo-
rate income tax base approximates the prots accruing to shareholders, not the prots
accruing to shareholders and debtholders. This means that for companies with higher
leverage (debt to asset ratio) total assets will be higher for a given level of shareholder
funds. This in turn implies that the more leveraged the company is, the lower its tax-
able prots to total assets ratio would be. This may be a serious concern, especially
11For a breakdown of taxable prots into various categories see Appendix, Fig 7.
12For more details see Appendix 1.5.1.
13Table 11 in the Appendix outlines what each measure includes and how they are related to each
other.
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in the light of multinational companies using debt shifting to minimize the size of their
corporate tax base. However, since I have detailed data on leverage, I can explore the
di¤erences in debt to assets ratios between multinational and domestic companies. This
o¤ers interesting insight into leverage di¤erences between various ownership types.
Another possible scaling measure for taxable prots could be shareholder funds.
Shareholder funds is a sum of issued capital and total reserves, which is the book value of
equity of a given company. By denition shareholder funds are equivalent to total assets
less liabilities, hence using this measure will exclude the discussion of leverage di¤erences
from the analysis. This may cause concern, since this measure does not reect prot
shifting through debt, which may be one of the sources of di¤erences in taxable prots
between ownership types.
The choice of the scaling factor cannot be discussed without considering the numer-
ator. Since most of the tax literature uses corporation tax variable from the prot and
loss account, a most natural candidate from the tax returns would be tax liability or net
tax payable. The interpretation of any tax measure scaled by total assets is not a very
obvious one. In turn, taxable prots scaled by total assets is a tax returns measure of
returns on assets. This measure is an indicator of how protable a company is relative
to its total assets. What is more, since the UK taxes small and medium companies dif-
ferently than the large ones, using taxable prots will eliminate the variation in the tax
rates from the analysis.14
3 Stylized facts
In this section I present novel stylized facts on companies contributions to tax and
taxable prots in the UK. Specically, I show the proportion of net tax payable and the
di¤erences in the mean ratios of taxable prots to total assets between various ownership
types. I further discuss possible explanations for the observed di¤erences.
Table 2 shows the fractions of net tax payable by ownership types. Columns 4 and 5
show the breakdown of net tax payable contributed by each ownership type for the selected
sample, while columns 2 and 3 show the same breakdown for the whole sample.15 Foreign
multinationals have contributed 23% of total tax in the UK over the years 2000 - 2011.
This, together with domestic multinationals and unidentied multinationals means that
multinational companies paid 55% of total UK corporation tax over the period. This
fraction is the same for taxable prots. Importantly, the fraction of tax revenues coming
from multinational companies has declined since 2000, from around 60 percent in 2000
to 50% in 2011 (Figure 8, Appendix).16
However, the comparison of the levels of tax liability or the levels of reported taxable
prots is not very informative, as we expect multinational companies to be much larger
14In the UK smaller multinational subsidiaries often qualify for tax payments using small and medium
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Table 2: Net tax payable by ownership type.
 whole sample (bln) % selected sample(bln) % 
foreign multinational  104.0  23%  69.9  22% 
domestic multinational  48.0  11%  29.1  9% 
domestic group  49.5  11%  34.9  11% 
domestic standalone  27.5  6%  24.7  8% 
other group  83.2  18%  58.2  19% 
unidentified multinational  97.7  21%  58.7  19% 
missing ownership  47.4  10%  35.6  11% 	Note: Total and proportion of net tax payable contributed by various types of
companies by ownership type (in billions of pounds), selected vs whole sample,
2000 - 2011. Whole sample refers to the universe of corporate tax returns from
the HMRC data, selected sample refers to the selection criteria described in
section 2.1. Source: HMRC data.
than domestic groups, which in turn would be larger than domestic standalones. If
multinationals are larger than domestic companies, then we would expect them to also
have more prots and hence pay more tax in levels. Therefore, I take into consideration
the discussion of the scaling factors and prot measures from section 2 and consider
the taxable prots scaled by total assets to understand the di¤erences in taxable prots
between companies by ownership type.
In Figure 1 I sum all taxable prots in each year by ownership type and do the same
for total assets. I then divide one sum by the other to arrive at the weighted means of
taxable prots scaled by total assets for each ownership type. In Panel A I show do-
mestic standalones, companies in the missing ownership category, foreign multinationals
and domestic group lines, while in Panel B I show in more detail the di¤erences between
di¤erent types of multinational companies and domestic groups. Domestic standalones
and companies in the missing ownership category report substantially more taxable prof-
its relative to their total assets than any other companies. For instance, the di¤erence
amounts to 10-11 percentage points between domestic standalones and foreign multina-
tionals. Moreover, domestic groups and other groups report more taxable prots than
multinational companies (Panel B). The di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total
assets between domestic groups and foreign multinationals is much smaller than the one
between domestic standalones and domestic groups, and amounts to 0.5 percentage points
between foreign multinationals and domestic groups at most, with the largest di¤erence
between other group and unidentied multinationals, 2 percentage points. These di¤er-
ences mean that foreign multinationals report 25 percent lower ratio of taxable prots to
total assets than domestic groups.
Further, it is important to note that domestic multinationals and unidentied multi-
tax rate.
15Net tax payable is the tax liability after accounting for double tax relief and marginal tax relief.
16The proportion of trading prots contributed by multinational companies is similar to that of net
tax (see Figure 8 Panel B).
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nationals are the two ownership groups which report the lowest ratio of taxable prots to
total assets. This may be because, as mentioned above, almost all of the domestic multi-
nationals actually report having subsidiaries, which means that their total assets measure
includes the equity value of those subsidiaries and hence is relatively larger than the size
of their unconsolidated operations in the UK. Conceivably, the same may be the case for
unidentied multinationals, for which I have no ownership data. These are the companies
that receive overseas income from abroad, and hence may be holding companies.
Figure 1: Taxble prots divided by total assets by ownership type.
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Note: Weighted ratio of taxable prots divided by total assets calculated for each ownership type and
for each year, 2000 - 2011, balanced selected sample. Panel A: domestic standalones vs multinatioanals
vs domestic groups, Panel B: all groups. Source: merged HMRC and FAME data.
If the primary driving force behind the di¤erences in taxable prots reported by
multinationals and domestic companies was prot shifting, I would expect the di¤erence
between domestic groups and multinational companies to be larger. Domestic groups
cannot shift prots abroad. On the other hand, I nd that domestic groups report much
lower taxable prots relative to total assets than domestic standalones. I now turn to
identify factors which explain the observed di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots to
total assets between ownership types.
3.1 How Do Multinational Companies Report Lower Taxable
Prots?
3.1.1 Proportion of zero taxable prot reporting companies
The rst aspect of explaining the di¤erence between multinationals and domestic compa-
nies is the proportion of observations where zero taxable prots are reported. 60 percent
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of observations identied as domestic multinationals and foreign multinationals report
zero taxable prots (NB they may also make losses). In contrast domestic standalones
report the lowest proportion of zero taxable prots, 27.5 percent. Domestic groups place
in between those two extreme categories reporting zero taxable prots for 46 percent of
their observations (Table 3).17 These proportions uctuate slightly over time and they
all increased following the nancial crisis. However, the ranking between ownership types
have remained unchanged since the beginning of the sample.
Table 3: Proportions of observations reporting zero taxable prots by ownership type.
 all observations do not report trading loss report trading loss 
foreign multinational 59.2% 33.7% 25.6% 
domestic multi 62.5% 48.1% 14.4% 
domestic group 46.0% 23.9% 22.1% 
domestic standalone 27.5% 9.8% 17.7% 
other group 49.0% 18.1% 31.0% 
unidentified multi 44.4% 26.2% 18.2% 
missing ownership 34.9% 12.6% 22.3% 	Note: Column 1: fraction of observations reporting zero taxable prots, Columns 2 and 3 sum
up to column 1 and break zero taxable prots into observations with zero taxable prots, which
report to have trading losses, column 2, and those which report to have no trading losses, column
3. Selected sample, 2000 - 2011. Source: HMRC data.
The zero taxable prot reporting behaviour is persistent, especially amongst foreign
multinational companies. Specically, the mean zero taxable prot reporting spell is
the longest for foreign multinational companies and lasts 6 years. In contrast, it is only
3 years for domestic standalones.18 Further, over 73 percent of foreign multinational
companies report zero taxable prots more than once during the sample period, while
only 43 percent of domestic standalones do so.
Companies may report zero taxable prots for various reasons. They may be loss
making in the current year, they may be carrying losses back or forward or they may
be investing and hence using capital allowance deductions to o¤set them against their
taxable prots. The most important reason is likely to be the presence of taxable losses.
The UK tax system treats prots and losses asymmetrically. This means that when a
company makes a positive taxable prot, it pays tax. In turn, when it makes a loss, it
does not receive tax credit on this loss, but instead pays no tax in that year. The portion
of losses that is attributed to trading activities can be carried forward and o¤set against
positive taxable prots in future years or alternatively carried back and o¤set against
positive taxable prots in the previous year. In the tax return form, companies report
17Note that these fractions are very similar when I consider number of rms reporting zero taxable
prots at least once during the sample period.
18Here I limit the sample of observations to a balanced panel, where rms have to report taxable prot
for 12 years.
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losses separately from their taxable prots. Taxable prots are censored at zero, but part
of the losses that arise from trading activities can be recovered to understand where the
zero taxable prots come from.
I nd that over 57% of the zero taxable prot observations in the foreign multinationals
category report to have no trading loss. At the same time just over 36% of the zero taxable
prot observations in the domestic standalones category do so. This means that 34% of
all foreign multinationals report zero taxable prots and no trading loss relative to only
10% of domestic standalones (see columns 3 and 4 in Table 3). For domestic groups, this
fraction is 24%, placing it in between the two extreme ownership categories. However, it is
important to note that companies can use prot shifting techniques, such as high leverage,
abusive transfer pricing or royalty payments as part of their trading activities and hence
manipulate trading prots to put themselves in the trading loss position. Therefore the
trading loss position might not necessarily signify that a company is loss making in a
traditional sense, it might also be a sign of prot shifting.
Most of the zero taxable prot observations - 65% - come from observations where
companies report in their tax statement to have zero trading prots, no other sources of
taxable income, and hence zero taxable prots. In Figure 2 these are companies called
nothing to tax. Amongst those companies some have made a loss in that particular
year, some have used capital allowances or research and development expenditures to
reduce their taxable prots, some did both, and for some I have no further information
on how they reached zero taxable prots. 24% of observations which have taxable prots
equal to zero, come from companies claiming various deductions. These deductions in-
clude items such as, for instance, management expense, non-trade capital allowances or
interest distributions19. Specically, those companies report positive taxable prot before
deductions, but zero taxable prots after deductions. Companies claiming all of their re-
maining taxable prots as part of group relief constitute 2% of the zero taxable prots
observations (see Figure 2). A company with multiple subsidiaries in the UK, whether
domestic or multinational, can use group relief o¤ered by HMRC to o¤set losses made by
one of the companies in a group against prots of another company in that group. The
contributions to zero taxable prots by source do not di¤er substantially between various
ownership types; 63% of foreign multinationals report having nothing to taxrelative to
67% of domestic standalones.
To understand di¤erences between companies reporting zero and positive taxable
prots, I look at the di¤erences in their observable characteristics, in particular, size,
age, industry and headquarter location. In Figure 9 (Appendix), considering the two
most extreme categories, foreign multinationals and domestic standalones, I show that
zero taxable prot reporting companies are very similar to positive taxable reporting
prot companies in terms of size for both ownership types. Companies reporting zero
19For more details, see boxes 22, 24 to 30 and 32 on the CT600 tax return form in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Zero taxable prot observations by source.
	
deductions	24%	
group	relief	2%	
nothing	to	tax	65%	
carrying	loss	forward	from	previous	periods	9%	
Note: Sources of zero taxable prots come from the CT600 tax return form. Nothing to tax
refers to companies which report zero trading prots; carrying loss forward from previous
periods refers to companies which made positive trading prots, but have made losses in
previous periods and are claiming those losses against their positive trading prots; deductions
refers to box 33 in the tax return form, which is a sum of all tax deductible expenses; group
relief refers to companies that had positive taxable prots even after deductions, but were able
to o¤set those prots with losses of other members of the group. Selected sample, 2000 - 2011.
Source: HMRC data.
taxable prots seem to be slightly smaller, but not largely so.
In Figure 10 in the Appendix we can see that the distribution of age between positive
and zero taxable prots companies is not that di¤erent for both foreign multinationals
and domestic standalones. What is more, there are no marked di¤erences in terms of
whether their headquarters are located in higher or lower tax countries than the UK. Of
all foreign multinational companies with headquarters in countries with tax rates higher
than the UK one, 58% of observations report to have zero taxable prots in the UK. This
is not very di¤erent from the 54% of foreign multinational observations for companies that
have parents in countries with tax rates lower than the UK one that report to have zero
taxable prots in the UK. What is more, about half of foreign multinational subsidiaries
operating in the UK are headquartered in countries with higher statutory corporate tax
rates than the UK, while the other half is headquartered in countries with statutory
corporate tax rate lower than the UK one. This suggests that companies which report
zero taxable prots do not systematically come from countries where tax rates are much
lower. Multinationals headquartered in countries with lower tax rate than the UK might
have more of an incentive to locate their prots in their lower tax headquarters, hence
shifting them away from the UK and lowering their tax liability here.
Further, a large fraction of observations from the foreign multinational companies
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category in nance and services sectors reports to have zero taxable prots in the UK
(Table 12 in the Appendix). In case of domestic standalones more zero taxable prots are
reported in agriculture and construction sectors than by nance and services companies.
This is consistent with some of the recent newspaper articles "naming and shaming" large
foreign nance and services companies paying little or no tax in the UK.
3.1.2 Non-comparable size distributions
Another reason why domestic and multinational companies might have very di¤erent
ratios of taxable prots to total assets is because they are not comparable when it comes to
their size. Multinationals and domestic groups may be larger, more productive and hence
more protable than domestic standalones (Yeaple (2013)). In this section I consider how
multinational and domestic companies of comparable sizes di¤er from the non-comparable
ones. I focus the discussion mainly on the di¤erences between the two most extreme
categories, foreign multinationals and domestic standalones.
First, I look at the distribution plots of logarithm of trading turnover (Panel A)
and logarithm of total assets (Panel B) by ownership type to see whether there are
any overlapping regions between di¤erent types of companies (Figure 3). As expected
domestic standalones are much smaller than foreign multinationals. The density plot
of the size distribution of domestic multinationals seems to be furthest to the right,
while domestic standalones furthest to the left, with foreign multinationals, unidentied
multinationals, domestic groups and other groups in between.
To compare companies of the same sizes, I choose a sample of observations which in-
cludes the selected sample of foreign multinational companies and domestic standalones
only. I take the largest domestic standalone in terms of total assets in each 2 digit indus-
try and call all foreign multinationals larger than that domestic standalone, unmatched.
I then take the smallest foreign multinational in terms of total assets and call all domes-
tic standalones smaller than that multinational, unmatched. I now have what I call a
matched sample and an unmatched sample, where using my method I excluded almost
9% of foreign multinationals and 3% of domestic standalones (Table 4, Panel A).
Table 4: Tax and taxable prot ratios for matched and unmatched samples.
 
    taxable profits/ total assets tax/ total assets % of matched obs 
  matched unmatched matched unmatched  
Panel A: min, max foreign multinational 0.054 0.008 0.016 0.002 91.33 
 domestic standalone 0.108 0.251 0.025 0.053 97.19 
Panel B: 1 percentile foreign multinational 0.077 0.012 0.021 0.003 57 
 domestic standalone 0.108 0.395 0.025 0.052 95.1 
 Note: Weighted means of the ratio of taxable prots to total assets and the ratio of tax to total assets
split by manually matched and unmatched sub-samples for various matching methods; selected sample,
2000 - 2011. Panel A: min and max used as a size cut-o¤ benchmark, Panel B: top and bottom 1 percent
used as a size cut-o¤ benchmark. Source: merged HMRC and FAME data.
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Figure 3: Size distributions of companies by ownership type.
Panel A: trading turnover 
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Note: Panel A: logarithm of trading turnover, Panel B: logarithm of total
assets, selected sample, 2000 - 2011. Source: merged HMRC and FAME data.
One may worry whether the largest domestic standalone is representative of the pop-
ulation and whether it is not substantially larger than the average. The same concern
can be raised about the representative nature of the smallest foreign multinational. To
alleviate those concerns I also take top and bottom 1 percentile of the respective cat-
egories as a benchmark instead of the smallest and largest companies and perform the
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same analysis on this more limited sample. Using this method, 43 percent of foreign
multinational companies are larger than top 1 percentile of the distribution of domestic
standalones, while only 4.9 percent of domestic standalones are smaller than the smallest
1 percentile of the distribution of foreign multinational companies (Table 4, Panel B).
This suggests that the largest domestic standalone is not very representative of the rest
of the sample, while the smallest multinational is.
In Table 4, I compare the characteristics of the matched and unmatched samples in
terms of the main variables of interest, i.e. the ratio of taxable prots to total assets and
the ratio of tax to total assets.20 Strikingly, across both matching methods the mean
weighted ratio of taxable prots to total assets for the unmatched foreign multinationals
is much smaller, e.g. 0.8% for min max matching, than that for the matched ones, e.g.
5.4% for min max matching, while the ratio of taxable prots divided by total assets
for domestic standalones is much larger in the unmatched sample, 25.1% for min max
matching, than in the matched one, 10.8% for min max one. Generally, the matched ratios
are much closer to each other than the unmatched ones across both methods. This means
that more comparable companies in terms of size report more similar prots relative to
total assets and it is the tails of the distribution, i.e. the very large multinationals and
the very small domestic companies that are mainly driving the large di¤erence in the
weighted means.
In Figure 4 I plot the weighted ratios of taxable prots to total assets for domes-
tic standalones and foreign multinationals. Figure 4 also includes companies from the
missing ownership category and unidentied multinationals for which a similar matching
procedure has been applied. In Panel A I replicate Figure 1, which includes all observa-
tions from the selected sample. In Panel B, I limit the sample to include only companies
of comparable sizes, as summarized in Table 4. The exclusion of the very large multi-
nationals and very small domestic companies brings the ratios of taxable prots to total
assets for the analyzed ownership categories closer together. Here, the means of the
weighted ratio of taxable prots to total assets do not change substantially for domestic
standalones and missing ownership categories, but foreign and unidentied multinationals
report much higher taxable prots relative to total assets compared to Panel A. Foreign
multinationals still report the lowest ratios of taxable prots to total assets, but the
di¤erence between them and domestic standalones has declined substantially. The di¤er-
ence is around 11 percentage points using all observations, while after limiting the size of
compared companies it is around 4 percentage points at the start of the sample period
20Note that the mean ratios of taxable prots to total assets are calculated dividing the sum of taxable
prots by the sum of total assets for each sub-group.
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and 2 percentage points at the end of it.21 ;22
Figure 4: The ratios of taxable prots to total assets, various sub-samples.
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Note: The ratio of taxable prots to total assets (weighted means), selected sample, 2000 - 2011. Panel
A: selected sample, Panel B: selected sample after removing very large multinationals and very small
domestic companies, using top and bottom 1 percentile in each ownership group; Panel C: positive
taxable prots only on the manually matched sample, using top and bottom 1 percent of observations
in each category as a size cut o¤ point. Source: merged HMRC and FAME data.
Finally, I remove all observations for companies that have reported zero taxable prots
in a given year and calculate weighted means of the ratio of positive taxable prots to
total assets for each ownership type for companies of comparable sizes (Figure 4, Panel
C). First, the means of weighted ratios of taxable prots to total assets for all types
of companies increase. Second, the ratios of taxable prots to total assets for domestic
companies and multinationals is very similar during the sample period, conditional on
reporting positive taxable prots. This indicates the importance of zero taxable prot
reporting in accounting for the di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets
between multinational and domestic companies.
3.2 Why Do Multinational Companies Report Lower Taxable
Prots?
3.2.1 Di¤erences in leverage
The evidence from the literature shows that larger companies tend to borrow more and
hence domestic groups, which are larger than domestic standalones, might use more debt
21When I remove the smallest and the largest multinationals and domestic standalones, based on the
minimum/ maximum strategy, the di¤erence is a bit larger than in Panel B, as expected, with the foreign
multinationals line at 0.07 at its highest and 0.04 at its lowest.
22When comparing multinationals to domestic groups, I nd that the size of the di¤erence in the ratio
of taxable prots to total assets in the overlapping region is very similar to that in the whole sample.
This is because there are very few domestic group members for which no comparable multinationals
exist.
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as a tax shield (Frank and Goyal (2009), Graham and Leary (2011)). This is conrmed
in the data by looking directly at leverage (see Figure 5). Foreign multinationals and do-
mestic groups report having much higher debt to assets ratio than domestic standalones.
Their leverage is not very di¤erent from one another though.
The FAME accounting dataset includes information on stock measure of leverage
of companies, i.e. total liabilities divided by total assets. This allows me to consider
the di¤erences in debt relative to total assets between companies of di¤erent ownership
types. Specically, Figure 5 shows the averages weighted ratios of total liabilities to total
assets. Foreign multinationals, domestic groups and other groups have substantially
higher leverage than other types of companies. Domestic standalones and companies in
the missing ownership category have the lowest leverage in the second half of the sample
period, after 2005. Before 2005 their leverage was comparable with what unidentied and
domestic multinationals reported. The total leverage of foreign multinational companies
is the largest amongst all ownership categories and amounts to somewhere in the region
of 0.75 - 0.85, while the total leverage of domestic standalones is around 0.55- 0.45.
This shows that foreign multinatationals are indeed more leveraged. To the extent that
multinational companies use debt as part of their prot shifting strategies, this might also
give an indication on the extent of their debt shifting practices.23 Since interest payments
are deductible against taxable prots in the UK, part of the large di¤erence in the ratio
of taxable prots to total assets between multinationals and domestic companies, could
be explained by the di¤erences in leverage between ownership types.
As discussed in section 1.2.2 an alternative scaling measure for taxable prots that can
be used for comparison between ownership types is shareholder funds. Scaling taxable
prots by total assets and comparing the results to scaling taxable prots by book value
of equity will give me an indication on how much leverage is used by companies. Since
total assets measure is equivalent to a sum of liabilities and shareholders equity, we would
expect the total assets numbers to be larger for rms with the same shareholders funds
that have higher liabilities in the UK. This implies that scaling by total assets makes the
ratio of taxable prots to total assets smaller for highly leveraged rms. Figure 1.11 in
the Appendix compares scaling taxable prots by total assets with scaling by shareholder
funds. Taxable prot scaled by book value of equity are larger than those scaled by total
assets with the relative di¤erence largest for foreign multinationals. This conrms the
direct evidence from the leverage plots in Figure 5.
23The total leverage gure can be separated into group loans, which correspond to intra-group lending,
and other liabilities. Only domestic and foreign groups of companies have intra-group lending. Companies
may choose to locate debt in the UK for non-tax reasons, such as a preference to hold debt in their
headquarters, if these headquarters are located in the UK. In addition, intra- group lending could also
be an indirect sign of debt shitng practices. Group loans constitute between 13 %and 24 % of total
liabilities of foreign multinational companies.
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Figure 5: Leverage by ownership type.
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Note: Weighted means of leverage measured as the ratio of liabilities to total assets
by ownership type, selected balanced sample, 2000 - 2011. Source: merged HMRC
and FAME data.
3.2.2 Di¤erent industries in which companies operate
There is quite a large sectoral heterogeneity for companies in my sample (Table 5 and
Figure 6). There are clearly two signicantly di¤erent groups of sectors where companies
have di¤erent ratios of taxable prots to total assets The rst group includes companies in
mining, transportation and public utilities, retail trade, construction, wholesale trade and
manufacturing sectors. The companies in those sectors have substantially higher ratios of
taxable prots to total assets than companies that belong to the second group of sectors
(nance, insurance, real estate, services, agriculture and public administration).24 There
is quite a large gap between the two groups, especially prior to 2006, where companies
from sectors which have higher ratios of taxable prots to total assets report these ratios
to be in a region of 4-6%, whereas companies which have lower ratios of taxable prots
to total assets report these ratios to be in a region below 1%. The gap between the two
groups narrowed since 2006, due primarily to declining ratios of taxable prots to total
assets reported by companies in the construction and wholesale trade sectors. Mining has
always had the largest ratio of taxable prots to total assets, because it includes North
Sea oil companies, which pay much higher corporation tax rates than other companies
in the UK. Finance companies tend to have one of the lowest ratios of taxable prots to
total assets. This appears to pre-date the nancial crisis.25
These di¤erences are also quite pronounced between ownership types, where foreign
24The sectors are created using SIC 4 digit industry codes from which I use 1st digit to construct a
broad sector category. For the categories and corresponding digits see Table 5. The SIC 4 digit codes
data comes from the FAME accounting dataset.
25Note that 40 percent of companies in the UK belong to the services industry, while 15 percent are
in agriculture and 10 percent in transportantion and public utilities.
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multinationals report very low ratios of taxable prots to total assets in nance and
services sectors relative to domestic standalones (Table 5). Domestic standalones report
higher ratios of taxable prots to total assets for all but mining sector, where they do
not have much presence. The ratios of taxable prots to total assets for domestic groups
across industries are much more comparable to those of foreign multinationals. This is
consistent with the overall picture that the ratios of taxable prots to total assets of
domestic groups are more similar to those of foreign multinational companies than the
ratios of taxable prots to total assets of domestic standalones. Even though there are
major di¤erences between industries in terms of the ratios of taxable prots to total assets
reported, foreign multinationals have the lowest ratios across almost all sectors.
Table 5: Heterogeneity between sectors in the ratios of taxable prots to total assets.
Heterogeneity all obs foreign  multinational 
domestic  
standalone 
domestic  
group 
number 
of obs 
1: agriculture, forestry and fishing (01-09) 0.009 0.008 0.100  0.017  1,756,233 
2: mining (10-14) 0.103 0.124 0.028  0.063  164,224 
3: construction (15-17) 0.032 0.036 0.097  0.043  78,102 
4:manufacturing (20-39) 0.037 0.028 0.114  0.046  861,030 
5:transportation & public utilities (40-49) 0.048 0.029 0.136  0.041  1,153,223 
6: wholesale trade (50-51) 0.030 0.012 0.102  0.044  781,441 
7: retail trade (52-59) 0.053 0.044 0.109  0.030  930,901 
8: finance, insurance & real estate (60-67) 0.005 0.003 0.111  0.005  640,831 
9: services (70-89) 0.008 0.011 0.113  0.017  4,740,751 
10: public administration (91-98) 0.008 0.015 0.124  0.020  828,096 	
Note: The ratio of taxable prots to total assets, weighted averages, heterogeneity between sectors for
the years 2000-2011, di¤erences between ownership types, selected sample. Source: merged HMRC and
FAME data.
3.2.3 Investment and productivity di¤erences
Another possible explanation for lower ratio of taxable prots to total assets for multi-
national companies could be that multinationals invest more or spend more money on
research and development (R&D) than domestic rms. Therefore they may be entitled to
legitimate tax deductions such as capital allowances that can be responsible for bringing
their prots down. This may also partially explain the larger fraction of zero taxable
prot reporting companies amongst multinational companies as both capital allowances
and R&D tax credits could be used to reduce the taxable prots to zero.
In Table 6 I present the ratio of capital allowances to total assets and mean capital
allowances for each ownership type. Domestic standalones tend to claim much higher
capital allowances as a fraction of their size than foreign multinationals, e.g. the ratio
of capital allowances to total assets claimed by domestic standalones is 0.046, while it
is 0.019 for foreign multinationals. Domestic groups claim 0.021 of capital allowances
22
Figure 6: Sectoral and yearly heterogeneity of the ratios of taxable prots to total assets.
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SIC ranges in brackets). Source: merged HMRC and FAME data.
relative to total assets, which again is in between the two extreme ownership categories
and much closer to foreign multinationals ratio. Foreign multinationals claim higher mean
capital allowances. However, this is primarily due to the fact that they are much larger
than domestic standalones. This suggests that capital allowances cannot be the driving
force in explaining the lower taxable prots reported by foreign multinational companies.
Further, the di¤erences in protability between rm ownership types do not come
from the di¤erences in productivity. There is large international trade literature which
investigates the productivity of multinationals relative to domestic companies (Yeaple
(2013), Harris and Robinson (2003), Gri¢ th (1999), Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006),
Girma and Gorg (2007), Wang and Wang (2015)) and nds that multinationals tend to
more productive than domestic companies.
To investigate this I calculate total factor productivity (TFP) for each rm in the
sample, which measures the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs
used in production. Here I use a measure of TFP based on value added, which subtracts
capital and labour inputs from rms outputs to measure the productivity residual, i.e.
TFPit = vait   (1   slit)  kit   slit  lit; where vait is logarithm of value added, where
value added is measured as a sum of wages and salaries and prot and loss before interest,
slit is share of labour, which is a ratio of wages and salaries divided by value added, kit
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is logarithm of xed assets, lit is logarithm of number of employees and i and t refer to
rm and year.
Using the rm and year specic TFPs, I calculate the mean TFP for each ownership
category across all sample years (Table 6). The mean total factor productivity is higher for
foreign multinational companies than for domestic standalones, which is consistent with
the previous literature on productivity di¤erences. Again the productivity of domestic
groups as measured by TFP here is very similar to that of multinationals in my sample.
These results suggests that the observed di¤erences in the ratio of taxable prots to total
assets between various ownership types cannot stem from the di¤erences in productivity.
It appears that more productive companies report lower ratios of taxable prots to total
assets.
Table 6: TFP and capital allowances by ownership type.
 
 mean TFP mean ca ca/ta 
foreign multinational  14.5   554,680   0.019  
domestic multinational  15.1   1,746,700   0.011  
domestic group  14.1   151,510   0.021  
domestic standalone  11.1   7,270   0.046  
other group  13.9   53,395   0.030  
unidentified multinational  14.4   406,751   0.017  
missing ownership  11.2   5,920   0.043  
 
Note: Column 2 shows mean total factor productivity (TFP) by
ownership type, column 3 mean of total capital allowances claimed
against taxable prots and column 4 weighted means scaled by total
assets; ca is capital allowances, ta is total assets; selected sample,
2000 to 2011. Source: merged HMRC and FAME data.
4 Conclusion
This paper uses the population of UK companies to present new stylized facts on taxable
prot reporting behaviour of UK companies. In particular, I show that multinational
companies paid the majority of the UK corporation tax, 55 %, over the period 2000 -
2011. However, the fraction of tax contributed by multinational companies to the UK
tax revenue has decreased over time and dropped from 60 % in 2000 to just over 50% in
2011. Multinational companies contribute this large portion of the UK tax revenue, in
spite of constituting only 3% of the number of all companies in the UK.
Even though multinationals pay a large amount of tax in levels, this is because they
are typically much larger and hence generate much more turnover and much higher prof-
its than domestic companies. Therefore in this paper I focused mainly on comparisons
between domestic and multinational companies in terms of the ratios of taxable prots to
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total assets. The ratio of taxable prots to total assets is much smaller for multinational
companies than it is for domestic companies. The largest di¤erence can be seen between
foreign multinational companies and domestic standalones, where domestic standalones
report 6 times more taxable prots relative to their size than foreign multinational compa-
nies. The di¤erence in the ratio of taxable prots to total assets is much smaller between
multinationals and domestic groups of companies.
This paper also identies factors associated with lower taxable prots of multinational
companies. I show that a large fraction - 60 percent - of observations in the multinational
ownership category reports zero taxable prots, while domestic companies have much
lower propensity to report zero taxable prots. Further, I explore di¤erences in leverage,
industry distribution, size distribution, productivity and capital allowances as possible
factors that could contribute to lower taxable prots of multinational companies. In
particular, I show that multinational companies have higher leverage and are more pro-
ductive than domestic companies. Multinational companies also report particularly low
ratios of taxable prots to total assets in nance sector. In turn, it is domestic compa-
nies which on average claim higher capital allowances relative to total assets. Finally,
the more comparable the size of multinational and domestic companies, the closer their
ratios of taxable prots to total assets are.
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5 Appendices
5.1 Further description of variables and data
5.1.1 Detailed ownership denitions
Comparing multinational companies to domestic companies means that one of the crucial
parts of this paper is the identication of companies into the right ownership category. To
do so, I start by using the ownership information available in the FAME dataset which
contains data on global ultimate owners of companies, their country of residence and
whether they are companies or individuals. I dene a multinational as a company that
 has an ultimate parent which is not located in the UK26, OR
 has a (wholly-owned) direct subsidiary which is not located in the UK, OR
 has a (wholly-owned) a¢ liate in the chain of ownership which is not located in the
UK (ownership chain goes 10 levels down), OR
26"To dene an Ultimate Owner, FAME analyses the shareholding structure of a company having an
Independence Indicator di¤erent from A+, A or A- (which means that the company is independent and
consequently, has no Ultimate Owner). It looks for the shareholder with the highest direct or total %
of ownership. If this shareholder is independent, it is dened as the Ultimate Owner of the subject
company and a UO link is created between the subject company and the Ultimate Owner. If the highest
shareholder is not independent, the same process is repeated to him until FAME nds an Ultimate
Owner." The quote is taken directly from the FAME ownership Help le.
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 has an ultimate parent which is located in the UK, but the ultimate parent itself
has a foreign subsidiary.
I also distinguish between domestic and foreign multinationals and multinational
subsidiaries and multinational headquarters. In the FAME data headquarter status is
equivalent to the ultimate owner status. This leads to e¤ectively having the following
multinational categories:
 foreign multinational subsidiary,
 domestic multinational subsidiary,
 domestic multinational parent.
In 70 percent of cases, FAME does not provide any information on the ownership
structure of companies. For those companies with missing ownership information, I sup-
plement the FAME ownership data with other variables from FAME and HMRC dataset
to identify companies into two additional ownership categories, which I call unidentied
multinationals and other groups. I dene a company to belong to the unidentied
multinationalscategory if:
 it has overseas income (box 9 on the CT600 form is larger than 0), OR
 it has claimed double tax relief (box 73 on the CT600 form is larger than 0).27
I dene a company to belong to other groupscategory if:
 it has internal debt that is larger than 0 (using FAME long and short term internal
borrowing), OR
 it does indicate on the CT600 form that it is part of the group (part of a group X
in the CT600 form), OR
 it claims group relief in the CT600 form (group relief in any of the years it existed
is larger than 0 in box 36 on the CT600 form), OR
 it has losses to surrender as group relief (box 123 on the CT600 form is non zero).
For unidentied multinationals and other groups categories there is a time dimension
to the ownership data. To avoid a situation where in some ownership categories I have
companies being various types in di¤erent years, I assume that if a rm ever claimed any
of the deductions it belongs to that given category in all other years.
27Note that overseas income refers to a narrow notion of income that has been generated by a foreign
company abroad and is paid back to the UK a¢ liate of that company.
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5.1.2 Criteria to select the sample for the analysis
Table 7 summarizes the detailed characteristics of the selected sample, where the last
row shows the size of the sample after all selection criteria have been applied. The table
also outlines how each selection criteria a¤ects the number of observations, the total tax
liability, trading turnover, trading prots and total assets. In what follows, I discuss each
selection criteria in turn.
First, to be in the selected sample, I require the HMRC companies to be matched with
the FAME data28. The matching is performed using rm and time identier. Specically,
the unique rm identiers from FAME and HMRC datasets are anonymized and matched
by HMRC. The accounting period end date from FAME and the statement date from
the CT600 form are merged as time indicators. Most of the unmatched companies come
from the missing ownership category.
Second, I require the company from the FAME data to be reporting an unconsolidated
statement and not consolidated or missing. Since companies report unconsolidated tax
returns data on the CT600 forms, I require the accounting data to be reported at the
unconsolidated level too. FAME never provides both consolidated and unconsolidated
data for the same rm in the same year. Hence the matching algorithm can match a
consolidated account from FAME with unconsolidated data from the HMRC.29 Since it
is often the company headquarters that report consolidated statements, I also exclude
them from the selected sample.
Removing consolidated and missing nancial reporting observations constitutes only
2% of companies, but those 300,000 observations account for over 20% of total tax liabil-
ity, 16% of trading turnover and 70% of total assets. The fraction of observations with
missing nancial reporting type is very small and the fraction of tax that they pay is
also very small. Most of these 300,000 observations come from consolidated statements.
The fact that the exclusion of consolidated statements accounts for 70% of total assets is
unsurprising since the consolidated statement would include information on total assets
of multinational groups abroad. More importantly, those 2% of companies seem to con-
tribute 20 percent of the tax liability in the UK, and together with the fact that they have
large total assets it suggests that they are likely to be large and protable companies.
Therefore omitting them from the analysis might a¤ect the results. However, since those
2 percent of companies report only consolidated accounting statements in FAME, I have
no measure of the size of their operations in the UK. The issue is most severe for domes-
28Special thanks to Strahil Leopev and Giorgia Ma¢ ni for sharing their matching strategy and baseline
dataset with me.
29For smaller companies FAME will sometimes have alternating consolidated and unconsolidated data,
switching from one to another depending on the year. In that case, if the trading turnover in FAME
matches the trading turnover in the HMRC data, I keep that company in the sample and assign it to
unconsolidated group. If the trading turnover is di¤erent by more than 10% between tax and accounting
datasets, I exclude that company from my selected sample.
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tic multinationals, which report 27% of their accounts as consolidated ones, while foreign
multinationals and unidentied multinationals report only 7%. Most of the tax liability
excluded from the selected sample comes from the consolidated accounts of various types
of multinationals (see Table 8).30
Specically, Table 8 shows the proportions of tax, trading prots, trading turnover
and taxable prots excluded through sample selection by ownership category. The sample
selection process discards almost half of domestic multinationals. The companies with
the largest fraction of remaining observations are domestic standalones, domestic groups
and foreign multinationals (all above 70%). However, it is unidentied multinationals
closely followed by foreign multinational companies for which we lose largest fraction of
their tax liability (40 and 38%), trading turnover (29 and 27%) and taxable prots (41
and 29%) due to the sample selection process.
Table 7: Summary of the sample selection criteria.
 number of observations total tax liability trading turnover total trading profits total assets 
CT 600 population 16.7  0.59   44.70   2.37   451.89  
matched with FAME 12.7  0.53   41.00   2.13   451.89  
unconsolidated 12.4  0.40   33.84   1.66   140.58  
12 months accounts 12.1  0.40   32.95   1.64   137.62  
non missing total assets 12  0.40   32.90   1.64   137.62  
 percentages 
matched with FAME 76% 89% 92% 90% - 
unconsolidated 74% 68% 76% 70% 31% 
12 months accounts 72% 67% 74% 69% 30% 
non missing total assets 72% 67% 74% 69% 30% 	
Note: Summary statistics on how many observations we loose at each step of the selection process and
what fraction of each of the following rm level observable variable levels we loose: total tax liability,
trading turnover, total trading prots and total assets; currency, pound; unit, million. Source: matched
HMRC and FAME data.
5.1.3 Additional information about variables in the merged dataset
In this section I dene and describe in detail the variables I use in this paper. The data
section in the main body of the paper discusses the choice of measures for taxable prots
comparisons between multinational and domestic companies. This section discusses the
availability of data that will allow for this comparison.
The CT600 data is my primary source for tax liabilities and taxable prots (Table
931). The most relevant variables are taxable prots (box 37) and tax liability (box 63).
It is also possible to break the taxable prots into prots before deductions (box 21)
minus deductions (box 33) minus group relief (box 36).32
30As another selection criteria to be included in the selected sample, I require companies to have 12
months of accounting data and positive total assets. This does not alter the sample in any meaningful
way.
31Schedule D Case V in Table 9 refers to income from overseas possessions (property, shares etc.)
32Box numbers correspond to the CT600 form.
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Table 8: Composition of the selected sample.
 tax trading profits trading turnover taxable profits 
foreign multinational 62% 72% 64% 63% 
domestic multinational 71% 54% 73% 71% 
domestic group 70% 76% 75% 71% 
domestic standalone 90% 90% 96% 90% 
other group 69% 73% 79% 70% 
unidentified multinational 60% 63% 71% 59% 
missing ownership 75% 79% 71% 76% 	Note: Proportions of tax, trading prots, trading turnover and taxable prots which remain in the
selected sample relative to the whole sample by ownership type. Source: HMRC data.
Table 9: Description of box numbers and corresponding variables in the CT600 form and
data.
box 
number variable name CT600 name variable description 
box 1 trading turnover total turnover from trade of profession turnover from trading activities 
box 5 trading profits trading and professional profits profits arising from trading activities 
box 9 overseas income overseas income within Sch D Case V 
income from overseas activities, such as 
dividend income 
box 18 net gains net chargeable gains gross chargeable gains minus allowable losses including losses brought forward 
box 21 profits before deductions 
profits before other 
deductions and reliefs total taxable income from all activities 
box 33 deductions total of deductions and reliefs 
sum of all deductions variable to 
companies, apart from group relief 
box 34 profits before group relief 
profits before charges 
and group relief difference between box 21 and box 33 
box 37 taxable profits profits chargeable to corporation tax 
difference between box 34 and sum of 
boxes 35 (charges paid) and box 34 
box 63 tax corporation tax corporation tax liability calculated based on box 37 profits 	
Moreover, the CT600 data o¤ers unique information on the items that contribute to
the taxable prots before deductions (boxes 3 - 20). The breakdown of prots before
deductions33 includes major items such as trading prots (box 5), bank, building society
or other interest, and prots and gains, from non-trading loan relationships (box 6)34,
33Note that data for box 21 in the CT600 data is missing for a large proportion of observations,
therefore I constuct it manually using the formula outlined on the CT600 form.
34This is simply the interest on deposits held by companies in banks, building societies and others.
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overseas income (box 9), net gains (box 18) and other items (sum of box 8, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15 less boxes 19 and 20). The trading activity refers to any activity which is the
result of a company carrying on its trade, i.e. operations; for example, selling goods in
case of Tesco.
In Figure 7 I show that there are marked di¤erences in the sources of taxable income
between companies depending on their ownership types.35 Domestic standalones derive
most of their income from trading activities in the UK, while multinational companies
derive only two thirds of theirs from trading activities. This is to be expected considering
the complicated nature of the activities of multinational companies. For instance, overseas
income constitutes quite a substantial fraction of total income of multinational companies
over the sample period. However, large fractions of overseas income have been sheltered
by double tax relief and no tax is due on the sheltered portion of that income. When I
exclude the overseas income sheltered by double tax relief, it appears that the unsheltered
overseas income did not contribute signicantly to the overall UK tax base (see Figure
7).36
Further, other groups and unidentied multinationals derive a substantial portion of
their income from other types of prots and from net interests of their loans. These
fractions are much larger than for other types of multinational companies.
Many companies in the HMRC data report to have missing trading turnover informa-
tion in spite of reporting positive taxable prots and positive trading prots. In Table
10 panel A, I consider the whole population of companies from the HMRC dataset and
calculate the proportion of missing observations for trading turnover and total assets.
In panel B Table 10 I do the same exercise but for the selected sample only (hence no
missing observations on total assets). The best coverage is o¤ered for foreign multina-
tionals and domestic standalones, 80% and 93% respectively. Interestingly, the majority
of domestic multinationals that report missing trading turnover are also those that report
consolidated statements in their accounts. Therefore it is impossible to know the size of
their operations in the UK.
The CT600 data contains some outliers. 122 of observations in the CT600 data
report negative tax liabilities. Since HMRC has informed me that should not be the case,
35Note that since companies do not have to ll in all the boxes in the CT600, some companies which
have no deductions to be itemised and no prots apart from trading ones will only ll in the taxable
prots box. Therefore Figure 7 does not inlcude all the prots before deductions in the UK.
36There was a tax reform in the UK in 2009 as a result of which UK switched from a worldwide to
a territorial tax system. After the reform rms no longer had to report dividends received from abroad
since they received no tax credit on them (Grubert (2009), Lohse and Riedel (2013)). As a result there
was a large decrease in the overseas income numbers reported on the CT600 form from 2010 onwards.
This decrease means that multinationals which derived a substantial part of their prots from overseas
income in the UK would report lower taxable prot numbers from 2010 onwards. However, the decrease
in the tax paid is not as large as the decrease in overseas prots. This is because part of the overseas
income was sheltered by double tax relief in the UK. Therefore multinational companies only paid tax
on part of their overseas income before 2009.
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Figure 7: Components of prots by ownership type.
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Note: Components of prots before deductions by prots type and ownership type. Other
prots is a sum of boxes 8 (annual payments not arising from loan relationships), 10 (income
from which income tax has been deducted), 11 (income from UK land and buildings) and 15
(income from non-trading gains on intangible xed assets, tonnage tax prots and prots not
falling under any other heading). Box 6 (banks) refers to interest payments on loans. Selected
sample, years 2000 - 2011.
Table 10: Summary of missing observations.	 whole sample 	  missing trading turnover  %  missing total assets  %  no of obs  
foreign multinational  88,831  23%  49,374  13%  382,353  
domestic multinational  18,534  43%  4,420  10%  43,249  
domestic group  174,602  19%  105,188  12%  911,670  
domestic standalone  274,376  8%  601,604  17%  3,573,689  
other group  496,374  16%  620,396  20%  3,105,551  
unidentified multinational  125,965  29%  90,234  21%  427,459  
missing ownership  1,260,113  15%  2,727,700  33%  8,304,161  	 selected sample 	  missing trading turnover  %  missing total assets  %  no of obs  
foreign multinational  54,628  20%  -     -     276,818  
domestic multinational  9,705  43%  -     -     22,443  
domestic group  114,197  17%  -     -     686,083  
domestic standalone  190,511  7%  -     -     2,928,737  
other group  292,489  12%  -     -     2,365,955  
unidentified multinational  63,613  22%  -     -     283,205  
missing ownership  464,683  9%  -     -     5,423,953  	Note: Numbers and proportions of missing observations for trading turnover and total assets by own-
ership types. Comparison between whole and selected samples. Source: merged HMRC and FAME
data.
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I discard those observations. They are mainly part of the missing ownership group with
very little data available for them, hence I am inclined to believe that they might be
genuine mistakes. There are several cases where trading prots are larger than trading
turnover itself. I exclude those companies from the sample as well.
The selected sample also contains observations where taxable prots of a company are
larger than its trading turnover, in some cases even 10 fold. This can arise for two main
reasons; the rst is that companies selling assets or shares are liable to pay capital gains
tax on those sales. This will mean that a company with a small trading turnover in the
UK, could be reporting large taxable prots in some years due to shares or assets sales
and the prots arising from those. The CT600 form includes net gains that are added to
trading prots to obtain taxable prots.
The second reason why taxable prots may be larger than trading turnover could
be that companies are receiving dividend payments from their subsidiaries abroad. This
applies only to multinational companies. In this case, the taxable prot is often higher
than turnover for several years in a row. A substantial fraction of both foreign and
domestic multinational subsidiaries in the UK reports zero trading prots, while at the
same time pays a non-zero tax in the UK. Those are very likely holding companies which
often receive substantial amounts of overseas income, while having no trading activities
and no other prots. After UK switched from credit to exemption system in 2009, those
rms have ceased to report overseas income and hence they report no taxable prots.
Table 11: Balance sheet formulas - FAME data.
Line	 Formula	 Label	 Comments	
93	 87+88 shareholders'	Funds	 equivalent	to	total	assets	less	total	liabilities	
	 66+85	 total	liabilities	 	
66	 51+52+60	 current	liabilities	 includes	group	loans	(short	term)	
85	 72+79+82+84a+84b	 long	term	liabilities	(-)	 includes	group	loans	(long	term)	
70	 37+48	 total	assets	 	
37	 31+35+36	 fixed	assets	 	
31	 32+33+34+34 tangible	assets	 	
35	 	 intangible	assets	 	
36	 	 Investments	 	
48	 38+41+42+43+47	 current	assets	 includes	investments		
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Figure 8: Net tax payable and trading prots - contributions by ownership type.
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pro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Figure 9: Size distributions by ownership type, comparisons between positive and zero
taxable prots observations.
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Note: Panel A: distribution of logarithm of trading turnover, Panel B: dis-
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FAME data.
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Figure 10: Age distributions comparison.
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Note: Distributions of rmsage for positive and zero taxable prots observations,
di¤erences between foreign multinationals and domestic standalones; selected sam-
ple, 2000 - 2011. Source: matched HMRC and FAME data.
Table 12: Proportions of observations with zero taxable prots by sector and ownership
type.
	 foreign	
multinationals	
domestic	
standalones	 all	obs	
1:	agriculture,	forestry	and	fishing	(01-09)	 67.2%	 32.7%	 43.5%	
2:	mining	(10-14)	 53.5%	 32.4%	 38.6%	
3:	construction	(15-17)	 51.3%	 36.8%	 44.5%	
4:manufacturing	(20-39)	 53.2%	 31.3%	 40.3%	
5:transportation	&	public	utilities	(40-49)	 63.6%	 20.2%	 28.2%	
6:	wholesale	trade	(50-51)	 43.6%	 28.0%	 36.4%	
7:	retail	trade	(52-59)	 61.4%	 32.7%	 40.6%	
8:	finance,	insurance	&	real	estate	(60-67)	 56.3%	 27.3%	 39.7%	
9:	services	(70-89)	 62.2%	 24.5%	 34.9%	
10:	public	administration	(91-98)	 60.0%	 30.7%	 42.1%	
11:	non-classified	establishments	(99)	 60.0%	 44.6%	 51.5%		
Note: Comparisons betweenr foreign multinationals, domestic standalones and the whole sample;
selected sample, 2000 - 2011. Source: matched HMRC and FAME data.
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Figure 11: Comparison of two scaling measures for taxable prots - total assets vs share-
holder funds.
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Note: Panel A: Weighted ratio of taxable prots to total assets, Panel B: Weighted ratio of taxable
prots to book value of equity, both selected balanced sample, 2000 - 2011. Source: matched HMRC
and FAME data.
38
F
ig
ur
e
12
:
C
T
60
0
ta
x
re
tu
rn
s
fo
rm
.
	
	
Pa
ge
 1
CT
60
0 
(2
00
8)
 V
er
sio
n
2
Co
m
pa
ny
 T
ax
 R
et
ur
n 
fo
rm
CT
60
0 
(2
00
8)
 V
er
sio
n 
2
fo
r a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
pe
rio
ds
 e
nd
in
g 
on
 o
r a
fte
r 1
 Ju
ly 
19
99
Co
m
pa
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
Yo
ur
 co
m
pa
ny
 ta
x 
re
tu
rn
Ab
ou
t t
hi
s r
et
ur
n
Co
m
pa
ny
 n
am
e
Co
m
pa
ny
 re
gi
str
at
io
n 
nu
m
be
r
Ta
x 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
as
 sh
ow
n 
on
 th
e 
CT
60
3 
   
   
   
 T
yp
e 
of
 C
om
pa
ny
Re
gi
ste
re
d 
of
fic
e 
ad
dr
es
s
If 
we
 se
nd
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
 N
ot
ice
to
 d
eli
ve
r a
 co
m
pa
ny
 ta
x 
re
tu
rn
 (f
or
m
 C
T6
03
) i
t h
as
 to
 co
m
pl
y 
by
 th
e 
fil
in
g
da
te
 o
r w
e 
ch
ar
ge
 a
 p
en
alt
y, 
ev
en
 if
 th
er
e 
is 
no
 ta
x 
to
 p
ay
. A
 re
tu
rn
 in
clu
de
s a
 co
m
pa
ny
 ta
x 
re
tu
rn
 fo
rm
,
an
y 
Su
pp
lem
en
ta
ry
 P
ag
es
, a
cc
ou
nt
s, 
co
m
pu
ta
tio
ns
 a
nd
 a
ny
 re
lev
an
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n.
Is 
th
is 
th
e 
rig
ht
 fo
rm
 fo
r t
he
 co
m
pa
ny
? R
ea
d 
th
e 
ad
vic
e 
on
 p
ag
es
 3
 to
 6
 o
f t
he
 C
om
pa
ny
 ta
x 
re
tu
rn
 g
ui
de
(th
e 
Gu
id
e)
 b
ef
or
e 
yo
u 
sta
rt.
Th
e 
fo
rm
s i
n 
th
e 
CT
60
0 
se
rie
s s
et
 o
ut
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
we
 n
ee
d 
an
d 
pr
ov
id
e 
a 
sta
nd
ar
d 
fo
rm
at
 fo
r
ca
lcu
lat
io
ns
. U
se
 th
e 
Gu
id
et
o 
he
lp
 y
ou
 co
m
pl
et
e 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 fo
rm
. I
t c
on
ta
in
s g
en
er
al 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
yo
u 
m
ay
ne
ed
 a
nd
 b
ox
 b
y 
bo
x 
ad
vic
e 
Pl
ea
se
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 so
m
e 
bo
xe
s o
n 
fo
rm
 C
T6
00
ar
e 
no
t i
n 
or
de
r, 
re
fle
ct
in
g 
ch
an
ge
s m
ad
e 
sin
ce
 th
e 
fo
rm
 w
as
fir
st 
pu
bl
ish
ed
 in
 2
00
4.
Th
is 
is 
th
e 
ab
ov
e 
co
m
pa
ny
's 
re
tu
rn
 fo
r t
he
 p
er
io
d
fro
m
 (d
d/
m
m
/y
yy
y)
   
   
   
 
to
 (d
d/
m
m
/y
yy
y)
Pu
t a
n 
'X'
 in
 th
e a
pp
ro
pr
iat
e b
ox
(e
s) 
be
low
A 
re
pa
ym
en
t i
s d
ue
 fo
r t
hi
s r
et
ur
n 
pe
rio
d
A 
re
pa
ym
en
t i
s d
ue
 fo
r a
n 
ea
rli
er
 p
er
io
d
M
ak
ing
 m
or
e t
ha
n 
on
e r
et
ur
n 
fo
r t
his
 
co
m
pa
ny
 n
ow
Th
is 
re
tu
rn
 co
nt
ain
s e
sti
m
at
ed
 fi
gu
re
s
Co
m
pa
ny
 p
ar
t o
f a
 g
ro
up
 th
at
 is
 n
ot
 sm
all
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f t
ax
 a
vo
id
an
ce
 sc
he
m
es
No
tic
e 
of
 d
isc
lo
sa
bl
e 
av
oi
da
nc
e 
sc
he
m
es
Tr
an
sfe
r p
ric
in
g
Co
m
pe
ns
at
in
g 
ad
ju
stm
en
t c
lai
m
ed
Co
m
pa
ny
 q
ua
lifi
es
 fo
r S
M
E 
ex
em
pt
io
n
Ac
co
un
ts
I a
tta
ch
 a
cc
ou
nt
s a
nd
 co
m
pu
ta
tio
ns
• 
 fo
r t
he
 p
er
io
d 
to
 w
hi
ch
 th
is 
re
tu
rn
 re
lat
es
• 
 fo
r a
 d
iff
er
en
t p
er
io
d
If 
yo
u 
ar
e 
no
t a
tta
ch
in
g 
ac
co
un
ts 
an
d
co
m
pu
ta
tio
ns
, s
ay
 w
hy
 n
ot
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
 P
ag
es
If 
yo
u 
ar
e e
nc
los
ing
 a
ny
 Su
pp
lem
en
ta
ry 
Pa
ge
s p
ut
an
 ‘X
’ in
 th
e a
pp
ro
pr
iat
e b
ox
(e
s)
Lo
an
s t
o 
pa
rti
cip
at
or
s b
y 
clo
se
 co
m
pa
ni
es
,
fo
rm
 C
T6
00
A
Co
nt
ro
lle
d 
fo
re
ig
n 
co
m
pa
ni
es
,
fo
rm
 C
T6
00
B
Gr
ou
p 
an
d 
Co
ns
or
tiu
m
,
fo
rm
 C
T6
00
C
In
su
ra
nc
e,
fo
rm
 C
T6
00
D
Ch
ar
iti
es
 a
nd
 C
om
m
un
ity
 A
m
at
eu
r S
po
rts
 
Cl
ub
s (
CA
SC
s),
 fo
rm
 C
T6
00
E
To
nn
ag
e 
ta
x,
 
fo
rm
 C
T6
00
F
Co
rp
or
at
e 
Ve
nt
ur
in
g 
Sc
he
m
e,
fo
rm
 C
T6
00
G
Cr
os
s-b
or
de
r r
oy
alt
ies
,
fo
rm
 C
T6
00
H
Su
pp
lem
en
ta
ry
 ch
ar
ge
 in
 re
sp
ec
t o
f r
in
g 
fe
nc
e 
tra
de
, f
or
m
 C
T6
00
I
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f t
ax
 a
vo
id
an
ce
 sc
he
m
es
,
fo
rm
 C
T6
00
J
HM
RC
 0
9/
08
Po
stc
od
e 
Pa
ge
 2
CT
60
0 
(2
00
8)
 V
er
sio
n
2
3
Tr
ad
in
g 
an
d 
pr
of
es
sio
na
l p
ro
fit
s
4
Tr
ad
in
g 
lo
ss
es
 b
ro
ug
ht
 fo
rw
ar
d 
cla
im
ed
 
ag
ain
st 
pr
of
its
5
Ne
t t
ra
di
ng
 a
nd
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l p
ro
fit
s 
6
Ba
nk
, b
ui
ld
in
g 
so
cie
ty
 o
r o
th
er
 in
te
re
st,
 a
nd
 p
ro
fit
s a
nd
ga
in
s f
ro
m
 n
on
-tr
ad
in
g 
lo
an
 re
lat
io
ns
hi
ps
7
Pu
t a
n 
'X'
 in
 b
ox
 7
 if 
th
e f
igu
re 
in 
bo
x 6
 is
 n
et 
of 
ca
rry
ing
 b
ac
k a
 d
efi
cit
 fr
om
 a
 la
ter
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
pe
rio
d
8
An
nu
iti
es
, a
nn
ua
l p
ay
m
en
ts 
an
d 
di
sc
ou
nt
s n
ot
 
ar
isi
ng
 fr
om
 lo
an
 re
lat
io
ns
hi
ps
 a
nd
 fr
om
 w
hi
ch
 
in
co
m
e 
ta
x 
ha
s n
ot
 b
ee
n 
de
du
ct
ed
 
9
Ov
er
se
as
 in
co
m
e 
wi
th
in
 S
ch
 D
 C
as
e 
V
10
In
co
m
e 
fro
m
 w
hi
ch
 in
co
m
e 
ta
x 
ha
s b
ee
n 
de
du
ct
ed
11
In
co
m
e 
fro
m
 U
K 
lan
d 
an
d 
bu
ild
in
gs
12
 N
on
-tr
ad
in
g 
ga
in
s o
n 
in
ta
ng
ib
le 
fix
ed
 a
ss
et
s
13
To
nn
ag
e 
ta
x 
pr
of
its
14
An
nu
al 
pr
of
its
 a
nd
 g
ain
s n
ot
 fa
llin
g 
un
de
r a
ny
 o
th
er
 h
ea
di
ng
15
In
co
m
e 
wi
th
in
 S
ch
 D
 C
as
e 
VI
1
To
ta
l t
ur
no
ve
r f
ro
m
 tr
ad
e 
or
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
2
Ba
nk
s, 
bu
ild
in
g 
so
cie
tie
s, 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r f
in
an
cia
l c
on
ce
rn
s. 
Pu
t a
n 
'X'
 in
 th
is 
bo
x i
f y
ou
 
do
 n
ot
 h
av
e a
 re
co
gn
ise
d 
tu
rn
ov
er 
an
d 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 m
ad
e 
an
 en
try
 in
 b
ox
 1
Co
m
pa
ny
 ta
x 
ca
lcu
lat
io
n
In
co
m
e
Ch
ar
ge
ab
le 
ga
in
s
T u
rn
ov
er
1
£
6
£
11
£
10
£
20
£
19
£
9
£
8
£
12
£
13
£
14
£
16
£
17
£
3
£
4
£
5
£
bo
x 
3 
m
in
us
 b
ox
 4
15
£to
ta
l o
f b
ox
es
 1
2,
 1
3 
an
d 
14
18
£
bo
x 
16
 m
in
us
 b
ox
 1
7
2 7
ne
t s
um
 o
f b
ox
es
 5
, 6
, 8
, 9
, 1
0,
 1
1,
15
, 
& 
18
 m
in
us
 su
m
 o
f b
ox
es
 1
9 
an
d 
20
21
£
16
Gr
os
s c
ha
rg
ea
bl
e 
ga
in
s
17
Al
lo
wa
bl
e 
lo
ss
es
 in
clu
di
ng
 lo
ss
es
 b
ro
ug
ht
 fo
rw
ar
d 
18
Ne
t c
ha
rg
ea
bl
e 
ga
in
s 
19
Lo
ss
es
 b
ro
ug
ht
 fo
rw
ar
d 
ag
ain
st 
ce
rta
in
 in
ve
stm
en
t i
nc
om
e
20
No
n-
tra
de
 d
ef
ici
ts 
on
 lo
an
 re
lat
io
ns
hi
ps
 (i
nc
lu
di
ng
 in
te
re
st)
, a
nd
 
de
riv
at
ive
 co
nt
ra
ct
s (
fin
an
cia
l i
ns
tru
m
en
ts)
 b
ro
ug
ht
 fo
rw
ar
d
21
Pr
of
its
 b
ef
or
e 
ot
he
r d
ed
uc
tio
ns
 a
nd
 re
lie
fs
39
	
	
Pa
ge
 3
CT
60
0 
(2
00
8)
 V
er
sio
n
2
De
du
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 re
lie
fs
22
£
23
22
CV
S 
lo
ss
 re
lie
f, 
an
d 
lo
ss
es
 o
n 
un
qu
ot
ed
 sh
ar
es
  
un
de
r S
57
3 
IC
TA
 1
98
8
23
Pu
t a
n 
'X
' in
 b
ox
 2
3 
if 
th
e e
nt
ry 
in 
bo
x 2
2 
inc
lud
es
 
CV
S l
os
s r
eli
ef,
 co
m
ple
te 
an
d 
at
ta
ch
 fo
rm
 C
T6
00
G
24
M
an
ag
em
en
t e
xp
en
se
s u
nd
er
 S
75
 IC
TA
 1
98
8
25
In
te
re
st 
di
str
ib
ut
io
ns
 u
nd
er
 S
46
8L
 IC
TA
 1
98
8
26
Sc
he
du
le 
A 
lo
ss
es
 fo
r t
hi
s o
r p
re
vio
us
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
pe
rio
d 
un
de
r S
39
2A
 IC
TA
 1
98
8
27
Ca
pi
ta
l a
llo
wa
nc
es
 fo
r t
he
 p
ur
po
se
s o
f 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f t
he
 b
us
in
es
s
28
No
n-
tra
de
 d
ef
ici
ts 
fo
r t
hi
s a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
pe
rio
d 
fro
m
 
lo
an
 re
lat
io
ns
hi
ps
 a
nd
 d
er
iva
tiv
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
(fi
na
nc
ial
 in
str
um
en
ts)
29
  N
on
-tr
ad
in
g 
lo
ss
es
 o
n 
in
ta
ng
ib
le 
fix
ed
 a
ss
et
s
30
 T
ra
di
ng
 lo
ss
es
 o
f t
hi
s o
r a
 la
te
r a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
pe
rio
d 
un
de
r S
39
3A
 IC
TA
 1
98
8
31
Pu
t a
n 
'X
' in
 b
ox
 3
1 
if a
m
ou
nt
s c
ar
rie
d 
ba
ck
 
fro
m
 la
ter
 a
cc
ou
nt
ing
 p
eri
od
s a
re 
inc
lud
ed
 in
 b
ox
 3
0
32
No
n-
tra
de
 ca
pi
ta
l a
llo
wa
nc
es
33
To
ta
l o
f d
ed
uc
tio
ns
 a
nd
 re
lie
fs
34
Pr
of
its
 b
ef
or
e 
ch
ar
ge
s a
nd
 g
ro
up
 re
lie
f
35
Ch
ar
ge
s p
aid
36
Gr
ou
p 
re
lie
f 
37
Pr
of
its
 ch
ar
ge
ab
le 
to
 co
rp
or
at
io
n 
ta
x
Ri
ng
 fe
nc
e 
pr
of
its
 in
clu
de
d
24
£
25
£
26
£
27
£
28
£
29
£
32
£
30
£
35
£
36
£
31
33
£
to
ta
l o
f b
ox
es
 2
2,
 2
4 
to
 3
0 
an
d 
32
34
£
bo
x 
21
 m
in
us
 b
ox
 3
3
37
£bo
x 
34
 m
in
us
 b
ox
es
 3
5 
an
d 
36
16
9
£
16
9
Pa
ge
 4
CT
60
0 
(2
00
8)
 V
er
sio
n
2
Re
lie
fs 
an
d 
de
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 te
rm
s o
f t
ax
38
£
39 40 41
T a
x 
ca
lcu
lat
io
n
42 45 55
43 53
63
£
to
ta
l o
f b
ox
es
 4
6,
 4
9,
 5
2,
 5
6,
 5
9 
an
d 
62 p
56
£
p
46
£
p
54
£
58
59
£
p
57
£
61
62
£
p
60
£
44
£
48
49
£
p
47
£
51
52
£
p
50
£
77
£to
tal
 of
 b
ox
es
  7
1, 
72
, 7
3 a
nd
 76
p
70
£
p
71
£
p
64
£
p
67
£
68
£
p
69
£
p
65
£
p
72
£
p
73
£
p
76
£
p
74 75
38
  F
ra
nk
ed
 in
ve
stm
en
t i
nc
om
e
39
  N
um
be
r o
f a
ss
oc
iat
ed
 co
m
pa
ni
es
 in
 th
is 
pe
rio
d
or
40
  A
ss
oc
iat
ed
 co
m
pa
ni
es
 in
 th
e 
fir
st 
fin
an
cia
l y
ea
r
41
  A
ss
oc
iat
ed
 co
m
pa
ni
es
 in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 fi
na
nc
ial
 y
ea
r
42
  P
ut
 a
n 
'X
' in
 b
ox
 4
2 
if t
he
 co
m
pa
ny
 cl
aim
s t
o 
be
 
ch
ar
ge
d 
at
 th
e s
ta
rti
ng
 ra
te 
or
 th
e s
m
all
 co
m
pa
nie
s’ 
ra
te 
on
 a
ny
 p
ar
t o
f it
s p
ro
fit
s, 
or
 is
 cl
aim
ing
 
m
ar
gin
al 
ra
te 
rel
ief
En
te
r h
ow
 m
uc
h 
pr
of
it 
ha
s t
o 
be
 ch
ar
ge
d 
an
d 
at
 w
ha
t r
at
e 
of
 ta
x
Fin
an
cia
l y
ea
r (
yy
yy
)
Am
ou
nt
 o
f p
ro
fit
Ra
te
 o
f t
ax
Ta
x
63
Co
rp
or
at
io
n 
ta
x
64
M
ar
gi
na
l r
at
e 
re
lie
f
65
Co
rp
or
at
io
n 
ta
x 
ne
t o
f m
ar
gi
na
l r
at
e 
re
lie
f
66
Un
de
rly
in
g 
ra
te
 o
f c
or
po
ra
tio
n 
ta
x
67
Pr
of
its
 m
at
ch
ed
 w
ith
 n
on
-co
rp
or
at
e 
di
str
ib
ut
io
ns
 
68
Ta
x 
at
 n
on
-co
rp
or
at
e 
di
str
ib
ut
io
ns
 ra
te
69
Ta
x 
at
 u
nd
er
lyi
ng
 ra
te
 o
n 
re
m
ain
in
g 
pr
of
its
70
Co
rp
or
at
io
n 
ta
x 
ch
ar
ge
ab
le
71
CV
S 
in
ve
stm
en
t r
eli
ef
72
Co
m
m
un
ity
 in
ve
stm
en
t r
eli
ef
73
Do
ub
le 
ta
xa
tio
n 
re
lie
f
74
Pu
t a
n 
'X'
 in
 b
ox
 7
4 
if b
ox
 7
3 
inc
lud
es
an
 U
nd
erl
yin
g 
Ra
te 
rel
ief
 cl
aim
75
Pu
t a
n 
'X'
 in
 b
ox
 7
5 
if b
ox
 7
3 
inc
lud
es
 
an
y a
m
ou
nt
 ca
rri
ed
 b
ac
k f
ro
m
 a
 la
ter
 p
eri
od
76
Ad
va
nc
e 
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
ta
x
77
To
ta
l r
eli
ef
s a
nd
 d
ed
uc
tio
ns
 in
 te
rm
s o
f t
ax
66
•
%
66
Se
e n
ote
 fo
r b
ox
 70
 in
 CT
60
0 G
uid
e
40
		
Pa
ge
 5
CT
60
0 
(2
00
8)
 V
er
sio
n
2
78
Ne
t c
or
po
ra
tio
n 
ta
x 
lia
bi
lit
y
79
Ta
x 
pa
ya
bl
e 
un
de
r S
41
9 
IC
TA
 1
98
8 
 
80
Pu
t a
n 
'X'
 in
 b
ox
 8
0 
if y
ou
 co
m
ple
ted
 b
ox
 A
11
 in
 th
e  
   
  
Su
pp
lem
en
ta
ry 
Pa
ge
s C
T6
00
A 
81
Ta
x 
pa
ya
bl
e 
un
de
r S
74
7 
IC
TA
 1
98
8 
82
Ta
x 
pa
ya
bl
e 
un
de
r S
50
1A
 IC
TA
 1
98
8
83
 T
ax
 ch
ar
ge
ab
le
84
In
co
m
e 
ta
x 
de
du
ct
ed
 fr
om
 g
ro
ss
 in
co
m
e 
in
clu
de
d 
in
 p
ro
fit
s
85
In
co
m
e 
ta
x 
re
pa
ya
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
86
 T
ax
 p
ay
ab
le 
- t
hi
s i
s y
ou
r s
elf
-a
ss
es
sm
en
t o
f t
ax
 p
ay
ab
le
87
Re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 D
ev
elo
pm
en
t t
ax
 cr
ed
it,
 in
clu
di
ng
 a
ny
 v
ac
cin
es
 ta
x 
cr
ed
it,
 
or
 fi
lm
 ta
x 
cr
ed
it
88
La
nd
 re
m
ed
iat
io
n 
or
 li
fe
 a
ss
ur
an
ce
 co
m
pa
ny
 ta
x 
cr
ed
it
17
0
Ca
pi
ta
l a
llo
wa
nc
es
 fi
rs
t-y
ea
r t
ax
 cr
ed
it 
89
Re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 D
ev
elo
pm
en
t t
ax
 cr
ed
it 
pa
ya
bl
e,
 in
clu
di
ng
 
an
y 
va
cc
in
es
 ta
x 
cr
ed
it,
 o
r f
ilm
 ta
x 
cr
ed
it 
pa
ya
bl
e 
90
La
nd
 re
m
ed
iat
io
n 
or
 li
fe
 a
ss
ur
an
ce
 co
m
pa
ny
 ta
x 
cr
ed
it 
pa
ya
bl
e
17
1
Ca
pi
ta
l a
llo
wa
nc
es
 fi
rs
t-y
ea
r t
ax
 cr
ed
it 
pa
ya
bl
e
16
1
Ri
ng
 fe
nc
e 
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
ta
x 
in
clu
de
d
16
6
Ta
x 
un
de
r S
50
1A
 IC
TA
 1
98
8 
in
clu
de
d
91
Ta
x 
alr
ea
dy
 p
aid
 (a
nd
 n
ot
 a
lre
ad
y 
re
pa
id
)
92
Ta
x 
ou
tst
an
di
ng
 
93
Ta
x 
ov
er
pa
id
94
Ta
x 
re
fu
nd
s s
ur
re
nd
er
ed
 to
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 u
nd
er
 S
10
2 
FA
 1
98
9
Ca
lcu
lat
io
n 
of
 ta
x 
ou
tst
an
di
ng
 o
r o
ve
rp
aid
Ta
x 
re
co
nc
ilia
tio
n
89
£
bo
x 8
7 m
inu
s b
ox
 86
p
90
£
to
ta
l o
f b
ox
es
 8
7 
+ 
88
 m
in
us
 b
ox
es
 8
6 
an
d 
89
 p
92
£
bo
x 8
6 m
inu
s b
ox
es
 87
, 8
8, 
17
0 a
nd
 91
p
93
£
to
tal
 su
m
 of
 bo
xe
s 8
7, 
88
, 1
70
 an
d 9
1 m
inu
s b
ox
 86 p
87
£
p
88
£
p
91
£
p
94
£
p
78
£
bo
x 7
0 m
inu
s b
ox
 77
p
83
£to
tal
 of
 b
ox
es
 78
, 7
9, 
81
 an
d 
82
p
79
£
p
81
£
p
82
£
p
84
£
p
85
£
p
80
86
£
bo
x 8
3 m
inu
s b
ox
 84
p
In
di
ca
to
rs
95 96 97 98
Pu
t a
n 
'X'
 in
 th
e r
ele
va
nt
 b
ox
(es
) i
f, 
in 
th
e p
eri
od
, t
he
 co
m
pa
ny
 
95
sh
ou
ld 
ha
ve
 m
ad
e (
wh
eth
er 
it 
ha
s o
r n
ot
)
ins
ta
lm
en
t p
ay
m
en
ts 
un
de
r t
he
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n 
Ta
x
(In
sta
lm
en
t P
ay
m
en
ts)
 R
eg
ula
tio
ns
 1
99
8
96
is 
wi
th
in 
a 
gr
ou
p 
pa
ym
en
t a
rra
ng
em
en
t f
or
 th
is 
pe
rio
d
97
ha
s w
rit
ten
 d
ow
n 
or
 so
ld 
int
an
gib
le 
as
se
ts
98
ha
s m
ad
e c
ro
ss-
bo
rd
er 
ro
ya
lty
 p
ay
m
en
ts
16
1
£
p
16
6
£
p
17
0
£
p
17
1
£
bo
xe
s 8
7, 
88
 an
d 
17
0 m
inu
s b
ox
es
 86
, 8
9 a
nd
 90
 p
Pa
ge
 6
CT
60
0 
(2
00
8)
 V
er
sio
n
2
11
8 
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
nd
 p
lan
t o
n 
wh
ich
 fi
rs
t y
ea
r a
llo
wa
nc
e 
is 
cla
im
ed
17
4 
De
sig
na
te
d 
en
vir
on
m
en
ta
lly
 fr
ien
dl
y 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
nd
 p
lan
t
12
0 
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
nd
 p
lan
t o
n 
lo
ng
-li
fe
 a
ss
et
s a
nd
 in
te
gr
al 
fe
at
ur
es
12
1 
 O
th
er
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
nd
 p
lan
t
Qu
ali
fy
in
g 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
11
8
£
12
0
£
12
1
£
17
4
£
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t e
nh
an
ce
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
16
7
Pu
t a
n 
'X
' in
 b
ox
 1
67
 if 
th
e c
lai
m
 is
 fo
r 
film
s e
xp
en
dit
ur
e
99
 P
ut
 a
n 
'X
' in
 b
ox
 9
9 
if t
he
 cl
aim
 is
 m
ad
e b
y a
 sm
all
 
or
 m
ed
ium
-si
ze
d 
en
ter
pr
ise
 (S
M
E)
, in
clu
din
g 
a 
SM
E 
su
bc
on
tra
cto
r t
o 
a 
lar
ge
 co
m
pa
ny
10
0
Pu
t a
n 
'X
' in
 b
ox
 1
00
 if 
th
e c
lai
m
 is
 m
ad
e b
y a
 
lar
ge
 co
m
pa
ny
10
1
R&
D 
or
 fi
lm
s e
nh
an
ce
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
10
2
R&
D 
en
ha
nc
ed
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
f a
 S
M
E 
on
 w
or
k 
su
b-
co
nt
ra
ct
ed
 
to
 it
 b
y 
a 
lar
ge
 co
m
pa
ny
10
3 
Va
cc
in
es
 re
se
ar
ch
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
10
4 
En
te
r a
m
ou
nt
 e
qu
al 
to
 1
50
%
 o
f a
ct
ua
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 D
ev
elo
pm
en
t (
R&
D)
 o
r f
ilm
s e
nh
an
ce
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
Ch
ar
ge
s a
nd
 a
llo
wa
nc
es
 in
clu
de
d 
in
 ca
lcu
lat
io
n 
of
 tr
ad
in
g 
pr
of
its
 o
r l
os
se
s
La
nd
 re
m
ed
iat
io
n 
en
ha
nc
ed
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
99 10
0
16
7
10
1
£
10
2
£
10
3
£
10
4
£
10
6
£
10
5
£
10
8
£
10
7
£
11
0
£
10
9
£
11
2
£
11
1
£
11
4
£
11
3
£
11
6
£
11
5
£
11
7
Ch
ar
ge
s a
nd
 a
llo
wa
nc
es
 n
ot
 in
clu
de
d 
in
 ca
lcu
lat
io
n 
of
 tr
ad
in
g 
pr
of
its
 o
r l
os
se
s
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t c
ap
ita
l a
llo
wa
nc
es
 a
nd
 b
ala
nc
in
g 
ch
ar
ge
s
Ca
pi
ta
l A
llo
wa
nc
es
Ba
lan
cin
g 
Ch
ar
ge
s  
17
3
An
nu
al 
in
ve
stm
en
t a
llo
wa
nc
e 
 
16
4-
16
5
Bu
sin
es
s p
re
m
ise
s r
en
ov
at
io
n
11
5-
11
6
Ot
he
r n
on
-tr
ad
in
g 
ch
ar
ge
s a
nd
 a
llo
wa
nc
es
  
11
7
Pu
t a
n 
'X'
 in
 b
ox
 1
17
 if 
bo
x 1
15
 en
try
 in
clu
de
s 
fla
t c
on
ve
rsi
on
 a
llo
wa
nc
es
Ca
pi
ta
l A
llo
wa
nc
es
Ba
lan
cin
g 
Ch
ar
ge
s
17
2
An
nu
al 
in
ve
stm
en
t a
llo
wa
nc
e 
10
5-
10
6 
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
nd
 p
lan
t -
 sp
ec
ial
 ra
te
 p
oo
l
10
7-
10
8 
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
nd
 p
lan
t -
 m
ain
 p
oo
l
10
9-
11
0 
Ca
rs
11
1-
11
2 
In
du
str
ial
 b
ui
ld
in
gs
 a
nd
 st
ru
ct
ur
es
16
2-
16
3 
Bu
sin
es
s p
re
m
ise
s r
en
ov
at
io
n
11
3-
11
4 
Ot
he
r c
ha
rg
es
 a
nd
 a
llo
wa
nc
es
16
3
£
16
2
£
16
5
£
16
4
£
17
2
£
17
3
£
41
			
Pa
ge
 8
CT
60
0 
(2
00
8)
 V
er
sio
n
2
Ba
nk
 d
et
ail
s (
fo
r p
er
so
n 
to
 w
ho
m
 th
e 
re
pa
ym
en
t i
s t
o 
be
 m
ad
e)
Pa
ym
en
ts 
to
 a
 p
er
so
n 
ot
he
r t
ha
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
Re
pa
ym
en
t i
s m
ad
e 
qu
ick
ly 
an
d 
sa
fe
ly 
by
 d
ire
ct
 cr
ed
it 
to
 a
 b
an
k 
or
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
so
cie
ty
 a
cc
ou
nt
. 
Pl
ea
se
 co
m
pl
et
e 
th
e 
fo
llo
wi
ng
 d
et
ail
s:
Na
m
e 
of
 b
an
k 
or
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
so
cie
ty
Br
an
ch
 so
rt 
co
de
Ac
co
un
t n
um
be
r
Na
m
e 
of
 a
cc
ou
nt
Bu
ild
in
g 
so
cie
ty
 re
fe
re
nc
e
14
9
15
6
15
7
15
8
16
0
15
1
15
3
15
2
15
0
Co
m
pl
et
e 
th
e 
au
th
or
ity
 b
elo
w 
if 
yo
u 
wa
nt
 th
e 
re
pa
ym
en
t t
o 
be
 m
ad
e 
to
 a
 p
er
so
n 
ot
he
r t
ha
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
I, 
as
 (e
nt
er 
sta
tu
s -
 co
m
pa
ny
 se
cre
ta
ry,
 tr
ea
su
rer
, li
qu
ida
to
r o
r a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 a
ge
nt
, e
tc.
)
of
 (e
nt
er 
na
m
e o
f c
om
pa
ny
)
au
th
or
ise
 (e
nt
er 
na
m
e)
(e
nt
er 
ad
dr
es
s)
No
m
in
ee
 re
fe
re
nc
e
to
 re
ce
ive
 p
ay
m
en
t o
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
's 
be
ha
lf.
Si
gn
at
ur
e
Na
m
e 
(in
 ca
pit
als
)
W
ar
ni
ng
 - 
Gi
vin
g 
fa
lse
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
re
tu
rn
, o
r c
on
ce
ali
ng
 a
ny
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 co
m
pa
ny
's 
pr
of
its
 o
r t
ax
pa
ya
bl
e,
 ca
n 
lea
d 
to
 b
ot
h 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
nd
 y
ou
rs
elf
 b
ein
g 
pr
os
ec
ut
ed
.
De
cla
ra
tio
n
Th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
I h
av
e 
gi
ve
n 
in
 th
is 
co
m
pa
ny
 ta
x 
re
tu
rn
 is
 co
rre
ct
 a
nd
 co
m
pl
et
e 
to
 th
e 
be
st 
of
 m
y 
kn
ow
led
ge
 a
nd
 b
eli
ef
.
Si
gn
at
ur
e
Na
m
e
(in
 ca
pit
als
)
Da
te
  
(d
d/
m
m
/y
yy
y)
St
at
us
15
4
15
5 15
9
Po
stc
od
e
De
cla
ra
tio
n
Pa
ge
 7
CT
60
0 
(2
00
8)
 V
er
sio
n
2
M
ax
im
um
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
fo
r 
Ar
isi
ng
su
rre
nd
er
 a
s g
ro
up
 re
lie
f
12
2-
12
3 
 T
ra
di
ng
 lo
ss
es
 C
as
e 
I 
12
4
Tr
ad
in
g 
lo
ss
es
 C
as
e 
V
12
5-
12
6 
No
n-
tra
de
 d
ef
ici
ts 
on
 lo
an
 
re
lat
io
ns
hi
ps
 a
nd
 d
er
iva
tiv
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
s
12
7-
12
8 
 S
ch
ed
ul
e 
A 
lo
ss
es
12
9
Ov
er
se
as
 p
ro
pe
rty
 b
us
in
es
s 
lo
ss
es
 C
as
e 
V
13
0
Lo
ss
es
 C
as
e 
VI
 
13
1
Ca
pi
ta
l l
os
se
s 
13
2-
13
3 
No
n-
tra
di
ng
 lo
ss
es
 o
n 
in
ta
ng
ib
le 
fix
ed
 a
ss
et
s  
Ex
ce
ss
13
4
Ex
ce
ss
 n
on
-tr
ad
e 
ca
pi
ta
l a
llo
wa
nc
es
13
5
Ex
ce
ss
 ch
ar
ge
s
13
6-
13
7 
Ex
ce
ss
 m
an
ag
em
en
t e
xp
en
se
s 
13
8
Ex
ce
ss
 in
te
re
st 
di
str
ib
ut
io
ns
Lo
ss
es
, d
ef
ici
ts 
an
d 
ex
ce
ss
 a
m
ou
nt
s
12
2
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
39
3 
IC
TA
 1
98
8
12
3
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
39
3A
 IC
TA
 1
98
8
12
4
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
39
3 
IC
TA
 1
98
8
12
5
£ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
82
 F
A 
19
96
12
6
£ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
83
 F
A 
19
96
12
7
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
39
2A
 IC
TA
 1
98
8
12
9
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
39
2B
 IC
TA
 1
98
8
13
0
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
39
6 
IC
TA
 1
98
8
13
1
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
16
 T
CG
A 
19
92
12
8
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
40
3 
IC
TA
 1
98
8
13
2
£ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
29
 F
A 
20
02
13
6
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
75
 IC
TA
 1
98
8
13
8
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
46
8L
(7
) I
CT
A 
19
88
13
3
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
40
3 
IC
TA
 1
98
8
13
4
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
40
3 
IC
TA
 1
98
8
13
5
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
40
3 
IC
TA
 1
98
8
13
7
£
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
40
3 
IC
TA
 1
98
8
Sm
all
 re
pa
ym
en
ts
Re
pa
ym
en
ts 
fo
r t
he
 p
er
io
d 
co
ve
re
d 
by
 th
is 
re
tu
rn
If 
yo
u 
do
 n
ot
 w
an
t u
s t
o 
m
ak
e 
sm
all
 re
pa
ym
en
ts 
pl
ea
se
 e
ith
er
 p
ut
 a
n 
'X
' in
 b
ox
 1
39
 o
r c
om
pl
et
e 
bo
x 
14
0
be
lo
w.
 'R
ep
ay
m
en
ts'
 h
er
e 
in
clu
de
 ta
x, 
in
te
re
st,
 a
nd
 la
te
-fi
lin
g 
pe
na
lti
es
 o
r a
ny
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 th
em
.
Do
 n
ot
 re
pa
y 
£2
0 
or
 le
ss
Do
 n
ot
 re
pa
y 
su
m
s o
f  
   
  
or
 le
ss
. E
nt
er 
wh
ole
 fig
ur
e o
nly
14
1
Re
pa
ym
en
t o
f c
or
po
ra
tio
n 
ta
x
14
2
Re
pa
ym
en
t o
f i
nc
om
e 
ta
x 
14
3
Pa
ya
bl
e 
Re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 D
ev
elo
pm
en
t t
ax
 cr
ed
it
16
8
Pa
ya
bl
e 
fil
m
 ta
x 
cr
ed
it
14
4
Pa
ya
bl
e 
lan
d 
re
m
ed
iat
io
n 
or
 li
fe
 a
ss
ur
an
ce
 co
m
pa
ny
 ta
x 
cr
ed
it
17
5
Pa
ya
bl
e 
ca
pi
ta
l a
llo
wa
nc
es
 fi
rs
t-y
ea
r t
ax
 cr
ed
it
Su
rre
nd
er
 u
nd
er
 S
10
2 
FA
 1
98
9 
(in
clu
di
ng
 su
rre
nd
er
s u
nd
er
 R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
9 
of
 th
e 
In
sta
lm
en
ts 
Re
gu
lat
io
ns
)
Re
pa
ym
en
ts 
of 
ad
va
nc
e c
or
po
ra
tio
n 
ta
x c
an
no
t b
e s
ur
ren
de
red
.
14
5
Th
e 
fo
llo
wi
ng
 a
m
ou
nt
 is
 to
 b
e 
su
rre
nd
er
ed
 u
nd
er
 S
10
2 
FA
 1
98
9,
 
an
d 
eit
he
r
14
6
th
e 
jo
in
t N
ot
ice
 is
 a
tta
ch
ed
or
(p
ut
 a
n 
'X'
 in
 ei
th
er 
bo
x 1
46
 o
r b
ox
 1
47
)
14
7
wi
ll 
fo
llo
w
14
8 
Pl
ea
se
 st
op
 re
pa
ym
en
t o
f t
he
 fo
llo
wi
ng
 a
m
ou
nt
 u
nt
il 
I s
en
d
yo
u 
th
e 
No
tic
e
13
9
14
0
£
Ov
er
pa
ym
en
ts 
an
d 
re
pa
ym
en
ts
14
1
£
p
14
2
£
p
14
3
£
p
16
8
£
p
14
4
£
p
14
5
£
p
14
8
£
p
14
6
14
7
17
5
£
p
42
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working Paper series recent papers
WP17/13 Katarzyna Habu How aggressive are foreign multinational companies in reducing
their corporation tax liability?
WP17/12 Edward D. Kleinbard The right tax at the right time
WP17/11 Aaron Flaaen The role of transfer prices in profit-shifting by U.S. multinational
firms: Evidence from the 2004 Homeland Investment Act
WP17/10 Ruud de Mooij and Li Liu At a cost: The real effect of transfer pricing regulations
on multinational investments
WP17/09 Wei Cui Taxation without information: The institutional foundations of modern
tax collection
WP17/08 John Brooks The definitions of income
WP17/07 Michael P. Devereux and John Vella Implications of Digitalization for
International Corporation Tax Reform
WP17/06 Richard Collier and Michael P. Devereux The Destination–Based Cash Flow Tax
and the Double Tax Treaties
WP17/05 Li Liu Where does multinational investment go with Territorial Taxation
WP17/04 Wiji Arulampalam, Michael P Devereux and Federica Liberini Taxes and Location
of Targets
WP17/03 Johannes Becker and Joachim Englisch A European Perspective on the US plans
for a Destination based cash flow tax
WP17/02 Andreas Haufler, Mohammed Mardan and Dirk Schindler Double tax
discrimination to attract FDI and fight profit shifting: The role of CFC rules
WP17/01 Alan Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen and John Vella Destination-
based cash flow taxation
WP16/14 Anzhela Cédelle The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive: A UK Perspective
WP16/13 Michael Devereux Measuring corporation tax uncertainty across countries:
Evidence from a cross-country survey
WP16/12 Andreas Haufler and Ulf Maier Regulatory competition in capital standards with
selection effects among banks
WP16/11 Katarzyna Habu Are financing constraints binding for investment? Evidence from
natural experiment
WP 16/10 Li Liu and Ben Lockwood VAT notches, voluntary registration and bunching:
Theory and UK evidence
WP 16/09 Harry Grubert and Roseanne Altshuler Shifting the burden of taxation from the
corporate to the personal level and getting the corporate tax rate down to 15 percent
WP 16/08 Margaret K McKeehan and George R Zodrow Balancing act: weighing the
factors affecting the taxation of capital income in a small open economy
WP 16/07 Michael P Devereux and Li Liu Stimulating investment through incorporation
WP16/05 Tobias Böhm, Nadine Riedel and Martin Simmler Large and influential: firm size
and governments’ corporate tax rate choice?
WP16/04 Dhammika Dharmapala The economics of corporate and business tax reform
WP 16/03 Rita de la Feria EU VAT principles as interpretative aids to EU VAT rules: the
inherent paradox
WP 16/02 Irem Guceri Will the real R&D employees please stand up? Effects of tax breaks
on firm level outcomes
WP 16/01 Giorgia Maffini, Jing Xing and Michael P Devereux The impact of investment
incentives: evidence from UK corporation tax returns
WP 15/33 Anzhela Cédelle Enhanced co-operation: a way forward for tax harmonisation
in the EU?
WP 15/32 James Mahon and Eric Zwick Do experts help firms optimise?
WP 15/31 Robin Boadway, Motohiro Sato and Jean-François Tremblay Cash-flow business
taxation revisited: bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information
WP 15/30 Martin Simmler Do multinational firms invest more? On the impact of internal
debt financing and transfer pricing on capital accumulation
WP 15/29 Daniel Shaviro The crossroads versus the seesaw: getting a 'fix' on recent
international tax policy developments
WP 15/28 Zhonglan Dai, Douglas A Shackelford, Yue (Layla) Ying and Harold H Zhang Do
companies invest more after shareholder tax cuts?
WP 15/27 Martin Ruf and Julia Schmider Who bears the cost of taxing the rich? An
empirical study on CEO pay
WP 15/26 Eric Orhn The corporate investment response to the domestic production
activities deduction
WP 15/25 Li Liu International taxation and MNE investment: evidence from the UK change
to territoriality
WP 15/24 Edward D Kleinbard Reimagining capital income taxation
WP 15/23 James R Hines Jr, Niklas Potrafke, Marina Riem and Christoph Schinke Inter
vivos transfers of ownership in family firms
WP 15/22 Céline Azémar and Dhammika Dharmapala Tax sparing agreements, territorial
tax reforms, and foreign direct investment
WP 15/21 Wei Cui A critical review of proposals for destination-based cash-flow
corporate taxation as an international tax reform option
WP 15/20 Andrew Bird and Stephen A Karolyi Governance and taxes: evidence from
regression discontinuity
WP 15/19 Reuven Avi-Yonah Reinventing the wheel: what we can learn from the Tax
Reform Act of 1986
WP 15/18 Annette Alstadsæter, Salvador Barrios, Gaetan Nicodeme, Agnieszka Maria
Skonieczna and Antonio Vezzani Patent boxes design, patents,location and local R&D
WP 15/17 Laurent Bach Do better entrepreneurs avoid more taxes?
WP 15/16 Nadja Dwenger, Frank M Fossen and Martin Simmler From financial to real
economic crisis: evidence from individual firm–bank relationships in Germany
WP 15/15 Giorgia Maffini and John Vella Evidence-based policy-making? The
Commission's proposal for an FTT
WP 15/14 Clemens Fuest and Jing Xing How can a country 'graduate' from procyclical
fiscal policy? Evidence from China?
WP 15/13 Richard Collier and Giorgia Maffini The UK international tax agenda for business
and the impact of the OECD BEPS project
WP 15/12 Irem Guceri and Li Liu Effectiveness of fiscal incentives for R&D: quasi-
experimental evidence
WP 15/11 Irem Guceri Tax incentives and R&D: an evaluation of the 2002 UK reform using
micro data
WP 15/10 Rita de la Feria and Parintira Tanawong Surcharges and penalties in UK tax law
WP 15/09 Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud de Mooij, Michael Keen Base erosion, profit-shifting and
developing countries
WP 15/08 Judith Freedman Managing tax complexity: the institutional framework for tax
policy-making and oversight
WP 15/07 Michael P Devereux, Giorgia Maffini and Jing Xing Corporate tax incentives and
capital structure: empirical evidence from UK tax returns
WP 15/06 Li Liu and Ben Lockwood VAT notches
WP 15/05 Clemens Fuest and Li Liu Does ownership affect the impact of taxes on firm
behaviour? Evidence from China.
WP 15/04 Michael P Devereux, Clemens Fuest and Ben Lockwood The taxation of foreign
profits: a unified view
WP 15/03 Jitao Tang and Rosanne Altshuler The spillover effects of outward foreign direct
investment on home countries: evidence from the United States
WP 15/02 Juan Carlos Suarez Serrato and Owen Zidar Who benefits from state corporate
tax cuts? A local labour markets approach with heterogeneous firms
WP 15/01 Ronald B Davies, Julien Martin, Mathieu Parenti and Farid Toubal Knocking on
Tax Haven’s Door: multinational firms and transfer pricing
WP14/29 Anzhela Yevgenyeva The taxation of non-profit organizations after Stauffer
WP 14/28 Peter Birch Sørensen Taxation of shareholder income and the cost of capital in a
small open economy
WP 14/27 Peter Birch Sørensen Taxation and the optimal constraint on corporate debt
finance
WP 14/26 Johannes Becker, Ronald B Davies and Gitte Jakobs The economics of advance
pricing agreements
WP 14/25 Michael P Devereux and John Vella Are we heading towards a corporate tax
system fit for the 21st century?
WP 14/24 Martin Simmler Do multinational firms invest more? On the impact of internal
debt financing on capital accumulation
WP 14/23 Ben Lockwood and Erez Yerushalmi Should transactions services be taxed at
the same rate as consumption?
WP 14/22 Chris Sanchirico As American as Apple Inc: International tax and ownership
nationality
WP 14/19 Jörg Paetzold and Hannes Winner Taking the High Road? Compliance with
commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers
WP 14/18 David Gamage How should governments promote distributive justice?: A
framework for analyzing the optimal choice of tax instruments
WP 14/16 Scott D Dyreng, Jeffrey L Hoopes and Jaron H Wilde Public pressure and
corporate tax behaviour
WP 14/15 Eric Zwick and James Mahon Do financial frictions amplify fiscal policy?
Evidence from business investment stimulus
WP 14/14 David Weisbach The use of neutralities in international tax policy
WP 14/13 Rita de la Feria Blueprint for reform of VAT rates in Europe
WP 14/12 Miguel Almunia and David Lopez Rodriguez Heterogeneous responses to
effective tax enforcement: evidence from Spanish firms
WP 14/11 Charles E McLure, Jack Mintz and George R Zodrow US Supreme Court
unanimously chooses substance over form in foreign tax credit
WP 14/10 David Neumark and Helen Simpson Place-based policies
WP 14/09 Johannes Becker and Ronald B Davies A negotiation-based model of tax-
induced transfer pricing
WP 14/08 Marko Koethenbuerger and Michael Stimmelmayr Taxing multinationals in the
presence of internal capital markets
WP 14/07 Michael Devereux and Rita de la Feria Designing and implementing a
destination-based corporate tax
WP 14/05 John W Diamond and George R Zodrow The dynamic economic effects of a US
corporate income tax rate reduction
WP 14/04 Claudia Keser, Gerrit Kimpel and Andreas Oesterricher The CCCTB option – an
experimental study
WP 14/03 Arjan Lejour The foreign investment effects of tax treaties
WP 14/02 Ralph-C. Bayer Harald Oberhofer and Hannes Winner The occurrence of tax
amnesties: theory and evidence
WP14/01 Nils Herger, Steve McCorriston and Christos Kotsogiannisz Multiple taxes and
alternative forms of FDI: evidence from cross-border acquisitions
